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Essays on Economic Inequality
Maŕıa José Prados
This dissertation consists of three chapters on different aspects of economic inequality. In
the first chapter, I study the aggregate implications of health risk and access to health
care. At the individual level, health influences earnings potential, while income affects
access to medical care. I investigate how this interaction shapes the joint dynamics of
inequality in health and earnings over the life cycle, and I measure the redistributive impact
of policies that improve access to health care. For that, I introduce health shocks and health
care spending in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents. Earnings risk
is partially determined within the model due to the health-income feedback, and negative
shocks may drive agents into a low income-low health trap, thus magnifying inequality along
the life cycle. I estimate the process for health shocks and I calibrate the key parameters
of the model using survey data. The calibrated model successfully reproduces the joint
dynamics in health and earnings inequality in the life cycle. Like in the data, it predicts
that life cycle inequality in health is driven by a sharp decline in health status for the lowest
percentiles of the health distribution. I find that the health-income feedback accounts for
9 percent of total earnings inequality at retirement age as measured by the coefficient of
variation of earnings, and that it increases by almost seven times the persistence of shocks
to productivity. I also find that health care policies that facilitate access to health care have
redistributive effects, mostly through earnings improvements for those at the bottom of the
earnings distribution.
The second chapter, joint with Stefania Albanesi, studies the connection between recent
trends in earnings inequality and the behavior of labor supply of married women in the
U.S. The entry of married women into the labor force and the rise in women’s relative
wages are amongst the most notable economic developments of the twentieth century. These
phenomena were particularly pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, when participation of
married women grew from 38% in 1975 to a peak of 60% in 1996 and the male to female
ratio in hourly wages dropped from 1.60 to 1.34. Since the early 1990s, the growth in these
indicators has stalled, especially for college graduates. This development is puzzling in light
of the continued rise in women’s educational investments relative to men and their entry into
professional occupations. In this paper, we link the decline in married women’s participation
and wages relative to trend since the early 1990s to the growth of the skill premium, which
substantially accelerated in those years. Our hypothesis is that the growth in wages for
highly educated men generated a negative wealth effect on the labor supply of their female
spouses, reducing their labor supply and their wages relative to men. Disaggregated evidence
on skill premia by gender, gender wage gaps by education and labor force participation of
wives provides descriptive support for this mechanism. Specifically, starting in the early
1990s, the growth in the skill premium was lower for women, while convergence in wages
across gender slowed more for college graduates. Finally, participation of married women
declined starting in the early 1990s especially for college women, women married to men with
a college degree or to men in the top percentiles of the earnings distribution. We develop
a model of household labor supply which can qualitatively reproduce a negative effect on
wives’ participation of a rise in husbands’ earnings. We show that a calibrated version of
the model can account for more than half the decline relative to trend in married women’s
participation in 1995-2005, and more than two thirds for college women. The model can
also account for one third of the rise in the gender wage gap for college graduates relative to
trend in the same period.
In the third chapter I study the dynamics of earnings risk and inequality over the life
cycle for women, and document the gender differences in earnings stochastic processes faced
by workers. Female workers have a weaker average attachment to the labor force than their
male counterparts, and career interruptions have an impact on earnings. Therefore, it is to
be expected that the average earnings process differ by gender, and in this paper I study if
this is the case. The main empirical gender asymmetries I find in the profiles of earnings are:
i) inequality is lower amongst women than amongst men, ii) inequality peaks twice over the
life cycle for women: once during the fertile years, and the again later at retirement age, iii)
the differences in inequality evolution between educational groups are larger for men than
for women. I estimate the statistical properties of the earnings process, with and without
heterogeneity in age profiles, and find that the specification without profile heterogeneity
seems to fit the female workers dynamics better.
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It is well documented that income disparities among individuals grow over time within a
cohort. In the U.S, the variance of income almost doubles between ages 25 and 60. Under-
standing the source of this increase in inequality is of central relevance for macroeconomists
and policy-makers alike. While many forces, such as human capital accumulation, edu-
cation policies, search frictions, and heterogeneity in preferences have been considered as
determinants, residual inequality remains after taking them into account.1
In this paper I study the role of health shocks and access to health care in shaping
the dynamics of inequality in health and earnings over the life cycle. A large empirical
literature documents that, at the individual level, negative health shocks affect productivity
and income, while income and health insurance status affect spending on medical care and
health outcomes.2 When incorporated in a dynamic setting, this interaction between earnings
and health is magnified along the life cycle. If the feedback between health and income is
sufficiently strong, a sequence of adverse shocks might drive individuals into a low health-low
income trap. This paper studies the aggregate implications of these forces. How important
is health as a determinant of life cycle inequality? How much of the lifetime earnings risk is
produced by the feedback between health and earnings? What is the redistributive impact
of policies that facilitate access to health care?
Answering these questions requires a framework with the potential to generate inequality
in both earnings and in health on the life cycle of a cohort. In addition, the magnitude of
1 Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2006; 2011) study the role of human capital accumulation and initial
learning conditions to generate dispersion in earnings over the life cycle, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante
(2010) study the effects of education policies on earnings inequality, Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) find
that job mobility is an important source of risk, Kaplan (2011) studies the importance of search frictions
to achieve earnings dispersion, and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) allow heterogeneity in
preferences for work.
2 See section 1.2 for references and a review of this literature.
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the interaction between health and income shocks must depend on parameters that can be
disciplined with data. To achieve this, I introduce idiosyncratic health shocks and health
care spending in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents. In the model, the
interaction between health and income crucially depends on a small number of parameters
describing the trade-off between medical services and consumption, the degree of access to
health insurance, and the stochastic properties of the process for health shocks. I directly
estimate the process for health shocks and I calibrate the key parameters of the model
using survey data on health status, health care spending and income from the Medical
Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS).
First, I verify that the model successfully reproduces salient features of the joint dynamics
of health and earnings inequality in the life cycle that are not targeted in the calibration.
Importantly, it predicts that life cycle inequality in health status is driven by a sharp decline
in health for the lowest percentiles of the health distribution, as I see in the data. It also
predicts that the correlation between health and earnings increases over the life cycle, and
that the lower end of the earnings distribution also has the lowest average health levels.
Second, I investigate the importance of health-income interactions for health and earnings
inequality, and I evaluate the redistributive impact of policies that influence access to health
care. Two key contributions of my paper are to measure how much of lifetime earnings risk is
due to health risk, and to determine by how much agents can offset this risk through access
to health care. Idiosyncratic income risk and incomplete insurance are central components
of models with heterogeneous agents in the Aiyagari-Imrohoroglu-Huggett tradition, but in
my model earnings risk is partly endogenous thanks to the interaction between health and
earnings.
I find that the health-income feedback accounts for 9 percent of the increase in earnings
inequality over the life cycle, and that it is also responsible for 7 percent of the observed
4
persistence in the individual earnings process.3 I perform counterfactual exercises and find
that health care policies that increase health insurance coverage or make health services
more affordable have redistributive effects by improving the earnings outcomes of those at
the bottom of the earnings distribution. If everyone has an option to buy health insurance,
the fraction of insured workers goes up by 11 percent and the ratio between the 90 percentile
of earnings and the 10 percentile of earnings - a common measure of earnings dispersion
- would go down by 14 percent. If everyone has access to public health insurance, the
correlation between health and earnings is weakened, and it decreases by 12 percent.
In the model, heterogeneous agents receive uninsurable shocks to labor market produc-
tivity and accumulate assets. In addition to productivity, individual earnings also depend
on workers’ amount of healthy time, and agents receive shocks that potentially reduce their
health status. As in Grossman (1972), health has a consumption value (sick days generate
disutility) and a productive value (it determines available time at work). Agents can miti-
gate the negative impact of shocks to health by paying for medical services.4 For this, they
can also purchase health insurance, which results in a lower cost of access to medical care in
case a bad health shock hits.
In this setting, health shocks amplify existing inequalities and health care choices op-
erate as an internal propagation mechanism that increases the persistence that individual
productivity shocks generate on earnings. Because health and productivity are complemen-
tary for earnings, high productivity individuals have a high marginal return to their health.
Therefore, they are more likely to purchase health insurance and to choose a high level of
medical care when hit by an adverse health shock. To the contrary, low income and low asset
3 This fraction of persistence, measured as the autocorrelation coefficient of the process - implies that the
half life of an annual shock is amplified seven times.
4 Medical services in this context include all treatments, rehabilitation services and accessibility devices
that contribute to increasing a person’s ability at the workplace after suffering a medical condition.
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individuals who cannot afford a high level of medical treatment suffer earnings losses when
hit by an adverse shock to health. These effects amplify earnings and health inequalities
amongst ex-ante identical individuals during the evolution of their lives. In addition, the
accumulation of negative shocks to both health and productivity translates into a low health
status in some states. This low level of health is carried on to the next period, propagating
the persistence of productivity shocks and increasing the persistence of the earnings process.
To calibrate the model, I distinguish between health status and shocks to health. The
first one is an endogenous outcome that depends on agent’s choices, while the second one
is an exogenous shock which I identify with medical conditions and whose distribution may
depend on age. To measure the health status I use a continuous health score which is
comparable across individuals from the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS). The
MEPS also includes detailed information about medical conditions of individuals in each
period. I compile this information at the individual level, as described in section 1.2, to
obtain a measure of health-reducing shocks for individuals in different age groups.
Using the calibrated model, I argue that income-health traps help account for the extreme
disparity in income and in health amongst workers. In particular, I find that: i) 9% of
inequality in later phases of the life cycle is accounted for by health shocks; ii) the long-run
impact of early productivity differences is magnified by the presence of health shocks; iii) on
average, 5% of the lifetime earnings risk comes from the health channel and iii) health care
policies can have strong distributional impact through this channel, especially for those at
the bottom of the earnings distribution. I conclude that health shocks explain a significant
part of inequality in income and health in the U.S., and that health care policies have an
important impact on both these outcomes.
I use the model to evaluate how policies that affect different aspects of health care impact
earnings inequality and welfare. The experiments show that allowing more workers access
to employer-sponsored health insurance increases the fraction of the population that buys
6
health insurance, as well as their well-being. However, a fraction of the population would
still in that case not opt into private health insurance voluntarily. Therefore, in order to
achieve complete voluntary health insurance coverage, it is not enough to improve access to
insurance markets, but a subsidy to the health insurance premium needs to be put in place.
The degree of resulting earnings inequality declines as larger fractions of the population are
covered by health insurance.
Deaton and Paxson (1998) started an empirical literature that studies the connections
between health inequality and earnings inequality. They documented that health status -
as measured by body mass index and self-reported health - becomes more widely dispersed
within cohorts over time. They also documented that health status is positively correlated
with income within cohort-sex-year cells. Cross-country empirical evidence shows that health
inequality and earnings inequality are correlated at the aggregate level,5 but there is no
theoretical micro-founded model that generates this correlation in equilibrium.6 The main
contribution of this paper is to provide a framework with interactions between health and
earnings that is suitable to understand the connection between health inequality and earnings
inequality, and the determinants of their dynamics over the life cycle.
The model and methodology of this paper is closely related to a strand of the savings
literature that considers the life cycle effects of medical expenses of the elderly on savings
behavior, like Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2010), De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010),
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2010). Unlike that literature, the focus of my project is mostly on
the productivity consequences of health care decisions during the working life. Also, many
papers in this literature treat health expenditures as exogenous shocks, as their main focus
is in the asset accumulation consequences of medical expenditures. This category includes
5 See Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) for a survey.
6 See Deaton (2001).
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some of the most influential contributions to the literature, like Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes; Jeske and Kitao (2009); De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010). Other papers assume
that the evolution of health status is exogenous, like Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2010),
Imrohoroğlu and Kitao (2010) and Capatina (2011). However, as stated before, there is
evidence of health status responding to income shocks and health insurance status. This
channel is key for my analysis. My paper is also related to the work by Halliday, He, and
Zhang (2011). They study how investment in health interacts with labor supply during the
life cycle, although earnings are not risky in their setup.
This paper is also related to a recent strand of literature concerned with welfare evaluation
of policies related to health insurance schemes. Those papers usually do not consider the
impact on labor market outcomes and earnings dispersion, which is the main focus of this
paper.7 Unlike this literature, I am concerned with the interaction between health and
earnings dynamics. I explicitly distinguish between shocks to health and health outcomes,
and I estimate shocks to health form survey data. This feature allows me to study the role
of wealth, earnings, and credit constraints in accounting for health outcomes and medical
expenditures. Because I model the interaction between health and earnings, this framework
is suitable to assess the redistributive consequences of health care policies. Also, with my
model I can distinguish the effects on the path of earnings of all different types of shocks:
productivity, health, and health insurance.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the evidence on life cycle in-
equality in health and earnings. Section 1.3 introduces the model. Section 1.4 describes the
calibration strategy. Section 1.5 examines how the model performs against the data and de-
7 See Jeske and Kitao (2009), Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2010), Jung and Tran (2011), Pashchenko
and Porapakkarm (2010), Feng (2012). Hansen, Hsu, and Lee (2012) study Medicare buy-in with incomplete
markets, endogenous labor and adverse selection. Papers that include endogenous investments in health to
study the effects of health insurance policy are Ozkan (2011), Scholz and Seshadri (2010), and Cole, Kim,
and Krueger (2012).
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scribes the numerical results. Section 1.6 performs the policy exercises. Section 1.7 includes
robustness exercises. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Health and Earnings in the U.S.
In this section, I document salient features of the joint evolution of inequality in health and
earnings during the life cycle. To do this, I use data on health status, medical expendi-
tures, health insurance coverage, income, and demographic characteristics from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).8 Then, I briefly survey empirical findings from the mi-
croeconomics literature related to these facts. In subsequent sections, I evaluate to which
extent the model can reproduce these basic patterns.
A first challenge for any analysis of this type is obtaining a reliable measure of health
status that can be compared across individuals. Some commonly used measures are either
not comparable across individuals, or capture very narrow aspects of health.9 In contrast,
the MEPS includes a summary score for health called Physical Component Summary (PCS).
The PCS score provides a summary measure from a broad physical health perspective. It
weights answers to a short questionnaire which targets different measures of general health
and of physical and mental limitations in different activities.10 As a result, PCS summarizes
various objective characteristics of the health status of an individual, and it is comparable
across different age groups. Moreover, its continuous nature provides a scale suitable for
8 See appendix A.1 for a description of MEPS and the data.
9 A commonly used measure of health, which is collected in several surveys, is the self-reported, five-states
health status. Given its subjective nature, this measure is imperfectly comparable across individuals. In
addition, its discreteness makes it of limited suitability for quantitative analysis. For example, the health
loss that drives this measure from excellent to very good need not be the same health loss that turns a fair
into bad. A less commonly used proxy for health in the literature has been the body mass index. The obvious
drawback of this measure is that it captures a very narrow aspect of health.
10 See appendix A.1 for more information on PCS and the questionnaire from which it is computed.
9
numerical analysis.11 In my quantitative analysis, I interpret this score as the fraction of
time that can be effectively applied to productive activities.
A second challenge to discipline the quantitative analysis is to distinguish between health
status (a stock) and health shocks (a flow). After presenting the main facts, I present the
measure of health shocks that I estimate from the data and feed into my model. Finally, I
briefly survey empirical findings from the microeconomics literature related to these facts.
The main facts emerge from the analysis are as follows: i) health status, access to health
insurance and earnings are strongly correlated within groups of individuals with similar
observable characteristics; ii) inequalities in health and earnings grow larger as a cohort ages;
iii) the increase in health inequality during the life cycle is mainly driven through a worsening
in the health status of individuals in the lowest twenty percentiles of the distribution of health
status; iv) the correlation between health and earnings across individuals increases over the
life cycle; and v) uninsured individuals have lower health and more dispersion in both health
and earnings than insured individuals within age groups.
1.2.1 Facts
Inequality in Health and Earnings during the Life Cycle
In figure 1.1, I document the evolution of the dispersion in both earnings and health during
the life cycle, using the PCS measure for health status.12 The figure includes individuals
ages 20 to 64 years old, grouped in five-year age groups which are indicated by the lowest
age in each one. The left panel shows the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles of the earnings
distribution within each age group. In turn, the right panel shows the 90th, 50th and 10th
11 Feng (2012) also uses the PCS as measure of health status for his calibration exercise.
12 Deaton and Paxson (1998), as part of their well known series of papers on inequality patterns, document
similar patterns in earnings and health. In their analysis, they use self-reported health status and body mass
index to measure health.
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percentiles of the health distribution for these age groups.
Earnings inequality increases over the life cycle, in particular through the increase of the
higher percentiles of the distribution. Health inequality also increases over the life cycle.
Contrary to what occurs with earnings, the divergence in health status over the life cycle
is driven by the decline at the bottom of the health distribution. The ability to perform
productive tasks for very healthy individuals is slightly lower at age 60 than at age 20 (it
declines by less than 1%), implying that on average health declines for all individuals over
time. However, the health level of the most unhealthy individuals is much lower at age 60
than at age 20 (the 10th percentile of health between ages 60 and 65 is 43% lower than
between ages 20 and 25). This evidence is suggestive of persistence in health status of
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Figure 1.1: Inequality in earnings and health status over the life cycle
Relation between Health and Earnings
I document additional features of the joint distribution of health and earnings that will
inform the quantitative analysis. The literature that studies the causality aspects of this
behavior at the individual level is surveyed in sub-section 1.2.3 below.
Figure 1.2 displays the cross-sectional correlation between health status and earnings over
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the life cycle. Two characteristics are noteworthy. First, the correlation is always positive,
hence people with higher earnings consistently also score better levels of health. Second, on
average, the correlation between these two variables increases over the life cycle. It is weakest
for those in their 20s and early 30s, but increases with age until it reaches a maximum of 0.31
for those in their early 50s. The correlation sharply weakens during the early 60s as health
status deteriorates for all. This pattern for the correlation between health and earnings by
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Figure 1.2: Health and earnings over the life cycle
Figure 1.3 displays the distribution of health status for different age groups before re-
tirement. Within each age group, the figure shows the distribution of health for the bottom
30% and the top 30% of the earnings distribution. With age, average health level declines
and dispersion in health levels increases in both earnings groups. However, both effects are
stronger for the poorest than for the higher earnings workers. The mean health status of
those in the top 30% of the earnings distribution is higher than that for those in the bottom
30% of the earnings distribution. For example, the difference in average health between these
two earnings groups is 15% at age 45. The differences in mean health status across earnings
bins are larger for older individuals. Also, the standard deviation of health status amongst
those at the bottom of the distribution is twice as high as the standard deviation for those
12
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Figure 1.3: Health status distribution by age and earnings group
Health Insurance and Earnings
Another important dimension of inequality is given by the access to medical services. Health
insurance status determines what kind of medical treatment an individual can afford. In the
U.S., 18.7% of adults aged 21 to 65 years old in 2008 did not hold private health insurance
and did not qualify for public health insurance. Access to health insurance is an important
determinant of health outcomes, and it is also correlated with earnings. The group of
uninsured workers has on average 43% lower earnings than those insured, controlling for
all observables in a Mincer-type regression. In addition, the group of uninsured workers is
more heterogeneous than the insured in terms of earnings and hours worked. The residual
dispersion of log-earnings, a typical measure of labor market risk, is 60% higher for the
uninsured. Figure 1.4 shows the fraction of uninsured workers by percentiles of earnings.
44% of individuals in the first decile of the earnings distribution was uninsured in 2008, while
this figure is less than 5% of those in the last quartile of the earnings distribution.
13
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Figure 1.4: Fraction of uninsured, over percentiles of earnings.
1.2.2 Measuring Shocks to Healthy Time
In the model, I distinguish between two concepts: health status and shocks to health. The
previous section described the evolution of the measure of health status over the life cycle.
Here, I describe the measure of health shocks that I generate from the the data.
I use the medical conditions files in MEPS, that provide information describing medical
conditions for each individual reported by households in each wave of the survey. Households
are surveyed five times over two years. I discard conditions that were diagnosed before the
relevant survey period and I compile for each individual the new medical conditions that
appeared over the course of the survey.
Each medical condition affects health status and has the potential to generate some
level of disability, understood as some decrease in the physical and mental strength and
energy an individual has, and in the number and complexity of tasks that can be performed.
To measure the severity of the health shock, I weight each of these medical conditions
by the respective disability weight computed by the World Health Organization (WHO).
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The WHO’s Global Burden of Disease 2004 Update13 provides the list of disability weights,
which is a set of numerical weights attached to the wide array of non-fatal consequences
from different diseases and injuries. A disability weight is a weight factor that reflects the
severity of the disease on a scale from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (equivalent to death).14, 15
More precisely, the interpretation of these disability weights is the following: if a medical
condition implies a certain potential disability d, the resulting health status is reduced by this
fraction, so the new health status is health ∗ (1− d). A measure of the health shock received
by an individual must account for all conditions that appear in the period. Therefore, the
disability weights for all conditions the individual gets that period must be aggregated.
When there are J conditions, the cumulative effect on health is given by the shock s, defined
as follows
(1− s) = ΠJj=1(1− dj) (1.1)
Using this method, I compute the total disability weight for the total of each individual’s
medical conditions over the period.
The box plot in figure 1.5 shows the median (diamond), 25th and 75th percentiles (box),
and 5th and 95th percentiles (whiskers) of the distribution of health shocks by age group.
As expected, the shocks to health become more severe with age, and the variance increases.
Additionally the incidence of bad shocks (Pr(s > 0), not shown in this figure) also increases
with age.
For the quantitative analysis, I feed this distribution of health shocks (adjusted to the
length of the period) into the model, and the optimal solution to each individual’s problem
generates the evolution of his health status, conditional on his history of shocks.
13 http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/12/10-084301/en/
14 For discussions of this measure see Murray and Lopez (1996), Essink-Bot et al. (2002) and Mont (2007)
on using disability weights.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of health shocks
1.2.3 Literature on Causality between Health and Earnings
The health economics literature has documented that several measures of health and different
measures of socio-economic status are positively correlated at the individual level.16 In
particular, there is evidence of a two-way interaction between health and earnings. Health
losses have negative effects on earnings and in labor supply (both through the intensive and
extensive margins).17 The effects of income and wealth on health materialize through access
to health insurance, and medical treatment.18
This two-way interaction between health on earnings poses a challenging identification
problem. For this reason and given the diversity of health measures and health shocks
studied, the estimated effects in the literature cover a wide range. Attanasio, Kitao, and
Violante (2010) find that individuals who report a deterioration of (subjective) health status
16 See Cutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl (2008).
17 For a survey, see Currie and Madrian (1999).
18 Income levels have also been linked to differences in risky health behaviors, but the causality is not
clear in this case. See Cawley and Ruhm (2011).
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from good to bad experience an average fall in hourly wages of 15%, while Smith (1999)
estimates that a severe (moderate) health event implies a per period reduction of about
4 hours (1.5 hours) per week and a 15 (5) percentage point decline in the probability of
remaining in the labor force. Moreover, he finds that these effects are persistent in time.
Other studies focus on particular medical conditions. For example, Pincus, Mitchell, and
Burkhauser (1989); Mitchell and Burkhauser (1990) find that arthritis reduces earnings by
between 19 and 27%; Kahn (1998) finds that the labor force participation of diabetic males
is about 80% that of non-diabetic males, and Famulari (1992) finds an average loss of 22%
in wages for people with epilepsy. In my analysis, the effect of health on earnings is within
this broad range estimated in the literature.
At the same time, earnings and wealth affect health through access to health insurance
as well as through access to medical treatment. Newhouse and Group (1993) and Dow et al.
(1997) find evidence from the RAND Experiment that shows that people with access to health
insurance achieve better health outcomes,19 while Currie and Gruber (1996, 2001) find health
benefits from increased health insurance eligibility. Doyle (2005) finds better outcomes from
hospital treatment due to automobile accidents for those with insurance. Finkelstein et al.
find that insurance increases utilization and health outcomes in the Oregon Experiment.20
In addition to the effects of health insurance, the demand for health care is elastic with
respect to income and price. Newhouse et al (1993) have found that the use of medical
services responds unequivocally to changes in the amount paid out of pocket, and Akin et al.
control for ill bias and also find a positive price coefficient. Acemoglu, Finkelstein, and
19 The RAND Health Insurance Experiment was an experimental study of health care costs, utilization
and outcomes in the United States, which assigned people randomly to different kinds of plans and followed
their behavior, from 1974 to 1982.
20 The Oregon Health Study, conducted since 2008, was the first randomized controlled experiment to
examine the causal effects of having some type of insurance versus having no insurance at all on access to
and utilization of health care, family finances, and ultimately health status.
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Notowidigdo (2013, forthcoming) use oil price shocks to instrument income effects, and find
evidence of positive income elasticity of health care consumption.21
In my model, people with higher earnings or wealth are more likely to choose health
insurance and get more medical care, reinforcing the effect of earnings and health shocks
during the life cycle.
1.3 Model
I start from a standard life-cycle model with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk. I
augment this setting incorporating health status in the individual production function and
utility, and health risk. The main features of my model are that: i) agents face uninsurable
earnings and health risk; ii) an agent’s health status affects his amount of available time for
productive activities; iii) agents can total or partially offset the negative impact of health
shocks on their productivity by seeking medical treatment; iv) agents can purchase health
insurance and if so, reduce the cost of medical expenditures if a negative health shock hits.
1.3.1 Setup
Population Dynamics and Timing
The economy is populated by a constant measure of households who live for T periods.
Agents enter the labor force in the first period of their lives. They work until period t − 1
21 Disentangling the direct effect of earnings or wealth status on health is a difficult task, which many
papers in the literature have tried to accomplish. In order to account for the potential endogeneity of wealth
and earnings, wealth shocks have been used as instrumental variables (Meer, Miller and Rosen (2003),
Michaud and Van Soest (2008); Smith (2005)) with different results with respect to causation. Adams et al.
(2004) and a follow up work with extended data and cohorts by Stowasser, Heiss, and McFadden (2011)
apply a system of non-causality and invariance tests to rule out causality channels. The reanalysis with
fresher and more encompassing data by Stowasser, Heiss, and McFadden (2011) suggests that direct causal
links from SES to health can be ruled out for much fewer health conditions than in the Adams et al. (2004)
study. Therefore, there is still no consensus about definite results in this part of the literature.
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and in period t they retire. During periods t to T agents consume out of their savings and
a social security transfer they receive from the government. In each period, as many new
agents are born as old agents die. At birth, each agent draws a fixed effect for his process
of latent productivity. All agents start with the same stock of health. During their lives,
individuals face shocks to their productivity levels and their health. Shocks to the health























The timing of decisions is shown in figure 1.6. At the beginning of his working life,
the individual randomly becomes eligible to access health insurance or not. Then, in the
beginning of each period, agents receive a shock to their productivity. If eligible, given
their assets and their productivity level, they decide whether to accept of decline the health
insurance contract. After that, they are hit by a health shock. At that point, agents choose
how much medical treatment to get, at a cost that depends on whether they have health
insurance in that period or not. Finally, they produce, earn income, consume and save for
the next period at a risk-less rate.
Earnings and the Role of Health
Health status xt is normalized to take a maximum value of 1. A value of 1 indicates a
perfectly healthy individual, whereas a value close to zero indicates a large level of disability
or impairment. A value of zero means death, and since there is no mortality in the model
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health only takes strictly positive values: 0 < xt ≤ 1. Health is valued because it has an
instrumental value: it allows individuals to perform at their job and activities. In this sense,
and following the work of Grossman (1972) in a stylized way, health has a consumption
value (sick days generate disutility) and a productive value (it determines income levels).
Health status generates a “flow of healthy time” n(xt). This flow determines the maximum
amount of time available for market activities. Each unit of healthy time is transformed in
the market into zit units of labor input.
An important departure from Grossman’s setting is that instead of assuming a determin-
istic depreciation rate for health, I incorporate uncertainty about the evolution of health.
In each period, health is struck by a debilitating shock. If the shock takes a value of zero,
it has no impact on health, otherwise it has the potential to decrease the flow of healthy
time. Medical treatment and services help treat the condition and restore health. Medical
treatment only serves to cure a condition. Absent a negative health shock, there is no role
for medical treatment since there is no accumulation of health beyond the maximum level
of 1.
At any stage in their lives, health status evolve according to the following transition
equation:
xt = xt−1(1− st) +mt,
where st is a disabling health shock, or a measure of health loss. The shock to health st
is uncorrelated over time, and its distribution is age-dependent. I assume medical care m
helps to partially or totally restore the health status only in case of a bad health shock, so
0 ≤ m ≤ stxt−1. This assumption captures the persistence of the health process. Due to the
characteristics of health-related processes, the model is set up for low frequency analysis. In
the calibration, the model period is of ten years. For this reason it is sensible to assume
that health loses that are not treated and restored in past periods cannot be recovered in
20
subsequent periods. This captures the fact that health deteriorates by aging too if it is not
duly taken care of.
This way of modeling the impact of shocks on health has a natural correspondence with
the definition of the variables I use in the data, as explained in section 1.2. Namely, the
measure of health shock captures the fraction of health status that is potentially lost to
disability because of the medical conditions suffered. The method adopted to compute the
shocks from the data is a multiplicative adjustment method that implies that the increase in
disability due to comorbidity is proportional, and total disability is computed using equation
(1.1), reproduced here:
(1− sJ) = ΠJj=1(1− dj)
This implies that the disability due to comorbidity increases with more diseases but is
less than the sum of individual disability weights for all conditions. In the specification of
the model, st enters the law of motion for health xt in this way to be consistent with this.
The linear specification of the effect of mt implies that a unit of medical treatment is
defined in units of health status. The implied elasticity of health status with respect to
medical treatment is within the bounds set in the literature.22 It is further assumed that
there is no possibility to invest in health beyond 100% healthy state xi = 1, so xi,t = xi,t−1
if st = 0.
Workers supply labor inelastically, so the labor market earnings for an individual equal the
product of a rental rate of human capital services w, the agent’s potential productivity level z,
and the fraction of healthy time n(x) he has available that period. The agent’s productivity
22Grossman (1972) and the subsequent literature that builds on that model, assumed constant returns
to scale for medical services in the health production function. Galama et al. (2012) fail to find evidence
of decreasing returns to scale from medical services. Halliday et al (2011) and Ozkan (2011) estimate the
elasticity of health with respect to medical expenditures in the presence of shocks to be 1 and between
0.8 and 1.25, respectively. I am currently working on robustness exercises with respect to a more general
functional form xt = xt−1(1− st) +mϕt xνt .
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level and his available healthy time constitute his level of effective human capital. Both
components of effective human capital are risky, but workers can only affect the health
status. This means that they chose a health status level that provides some insurance for
the future. The optimal level of insurance achieved through maintaining a good health status
depends on the individual’s characteristics (age, productivity, level of assets). Also, due to
credit constraints some workers are not able to achieve their desired level of health when hit
by a bad health shock.
The underlying productivity level zi,t follows a stochastic process that depends on a
worker’s initial level of productivity, his age, and has a transitory and a persistent com-
ponent.23 The initial level of individual productivity can be interpreted as differences in
education, skills, ability, and health that are present at the beginning of the adult working
life. Earnings for an individual are given by
yi,t = wn(xi,t)zi,t,
where w is the market wage.
Health Insurance
At the beginning of their working lives, individuals randomly become eligible for private
health insurance or not. This status is assumed to be permanent. However, each period
those who are eligible decide if they contract health insurance or not. Health insurance
eligibility is correlated to an individual’s innate productivity level (as suggested by the data,
described in the calibration in section 1.4). These assumptions constitute a stylized way of
23 Explained to more detail in the calibration section 1.4 below.
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modeling access to private health insurance in the U.S.24
The insurance contract considered in this model captures one of the main components
of current regular health insurance contracts in the U.S., it provides a discount on medical
services.25 There is only one type of health insurance contract in this economy. A health
insurance plan consists of a premium p and a coinsurance rate (1− γ), which indicates the
fraction of the total medical charges, qm, that the worker pays out of pocket. The rest is
covered by the insurer.26 I assume that the health insurance sector is competitive, and the
premium is actuarially fair.
Therefore, the characteristics of the unique health insurance contract are summarized in
the parameters (p, γ). Health care policy can also change the share of individuals that are
eligible for health insurance.
Retirement Period
The focus of this model is on the interaction between health and earnings during the working
life. However, because this is a model of the life cycle, the inclusion of a stylized retirement
24 In the U.S., most people obtain health insurance from their employers. However, many people work
for firms that do not offer this option -usually smaller firms- or are self-employed. In spite of this, only 5%
of workers get health insurance in the individual market. The pervasiveness of employer-sponsored health
insurance is due to important differences between the group and individual health insurance markets. In
group health insurance contracts, the worker is not subject to health screening and the premium does not
depend on age. Also, medical underwriting is not permitted by large firms, therefore their premiums are
generally based in community rating. Also, if a worker takes group health insurance, the premium is tax
deductible. On the contrary, the tax benefit is lost with individual insurance, and moreover, the individual
market for private health insurance is problematic due to asymmetric information. In this market, medical
underwriting is allowed and many individuals with pre-existing conditions are denied coverage. Therefore,
modeling private health insurance eligibility as a random event, correlated to earnings ability, allows me to
capture these deficiencies in insurance markets.
25 I abstract from catastrophic health insurance plans. Catastrophic health insurance plans are high
deductible, low premium health insurance policies. These plans usually do not pay for regular medical
services but covers major medical expenses. Absent bankruptcy and mortality in my model, and given that
medical expenditures are bounded above, there is no relevance for these plans in this setting.
26 I abstract from access to public health insurance for now, but I am working on a version of the model
with an option of public insurance that, like Medicaid, is means-tested.
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period is crucial so that the model can adequately capture the dynamics of worker’s incentives
to save and to invest in health.
After period t workers retire. Worker’s receive social security payments in the form of a
transfer b from the government when they retire. Additionally, all retirees are automatically
enrolled in Medicare and pay a premium pMediCare. Medicare covers a fraction γ of their
medical expenditures.27 The weight of health in their utility is higher to reflect the im-
portance of old age medical expenditures and the increased need to buy comfort-enhancing
services when old.28 These last periods of life after retirement capture in a stylized way the
relevant aspects of the retirement period (all risks comes from the shocks to health) for the
behavior of savings during the life cycle.
Individual’s Problem
Individuals are heterogeneous in six dimensions: age t, assets carried over from the previous
period a, health status resulting from the previous period x, idiosyncratic labor productivity
z, shock to healthy time s, and health insurance eligibility status indicated by 1ins∈ 0, 1.
Agents maximize the expected present value of their lifetime utility, which depends on their
level of consumption and their health status.29 The rationale behind this assumption is
that health has intrinsic value, but moreover it has a largely instrumental value. Health is
necessary to pursue most of what else individuals value in life, and disease and disability
generate disutility because they prevent them from doing so. Because of this feature, this
problem is not analog to a human capital problem. Additionally, given that health is bounded
27 In this setting, Medicare is analog to the private health insurance during the working life. The only
differences are that everyone is enrolled in Medicare, and that the premium is subsidized.
28 See De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) and Palumbo (1999)
29 There is evidence that health status has a positive effect on the marginal utility of consumption, as
found by Palumbo (1999) and Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo, and several papers in the literature
include health in the utility function.
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above at 1 and that in the model everyone starts life with perfect health, this formulation
implies that if health declines below maximum level it has a negative effect on their utility
(as well as their productivity if the individual is in productive years), and when hit by an
adverse health shock they face a trade-off between medical treatment and consumption.
Agents maximize expected lifetime utility. The decision problem for a worker who has
been given the chance to contract health insurance is stated in problem (1) below, where c
indicates consumption, m medical services, and ins ∈ 0, 1 indicates the decision to contract






βtut (ci,t, xi,t) (1.2)
subject to:
ci,t + ai,t+1 + (1− 1ins,iγ) qmi,t + 1ins,i (1− τ) p = (1− τ) yi,t + (1 + r)ai,t
yi,t =
{
wni,tzi,t if t < t
b if t ≥ t
ni,t = n(xi,t)
xi,t = xi,t−1(1− si,t) +mi,t
0 ≤ mi,t ≤ si,txi,t−1




∼ Gt w/prob. (1− π)
zit ∼ exogenous process
An individual who does not have the option to contract health insurance solves the same
problem, except that in this case 1ins,i = 0 every period.
During their working lives, agents receive labor earnings, which is taxed at rate τ . After
they retire, they receive the fix pension payment b.
The choice of medical treatment not only depends on the level of productivity but also
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on the persistence of the exogenous productivity shocks. When a worker’s health is hit
by a health shock, he can get treatment m. The marginal benefit of recovering his health
consists of the marginal utility from health, the marginal utility of the extra earnings, and
the marginal future benefit of higher health in the next period. The marginal cost of seeking
treatment is given by the price of treatment in terms of forgone consumption. There is a
trade-off between health and savings (future consumption smoothing) because health status
has inter-temporal consequences.
Government
The government collects taxes on earnings. There is an income tax τy, that is used to finance
some level of government spending G. The revenues from taxing labor earnings at rate τss are
used to finance social security, and the revenues from taxing labor earnings at rate τMC are
used to subsidize Medicare (Medicare subsidies are called GMediCare). The combined income
and payroll tax is τ = τy + τss + τMC .
Firms
Firms organize effective labor and capital assets to produce the final good, so that Y =
f(K,L). The final good Y can be used as consumption good C or transformed at a linear
rate q into medical treatment M .
1.3.2 General Equilibrium and Optimal Policies
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a collection of cohort-specific policy functions {c(χ),m(χ), a(χ), h(χ), ins(χ)}
that depend on the individual idiosyncratic state χ = {t, a, x, z, s,1ins}, factor prices w and
r, health insurance premium p, and a measure µ(χ) of agents across states χ, such that:
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i ) Individual decisions solve the optimization problem given in (1), given prices.









where L are units of effective labor, which includes productivity z and healthy time x for
each worker.
iii) Wage, interest rate and health insurance premiums are determined in competitive
markets. Private premium payments (left hand side) equal the fraction of expected medical




dµ(χ|t < t) = γq
∫
X
m(χ|t < t)dµ(χ|t < t)
Collected Medicare premiums plus the government’s subsidy to Medicare equal the fraction




dµ(χ|t ≥ t) = γq
∫
X
m(χ|t ≥ t)dµ(χ|t ≥ t)
The resulting wage and interest rate are:














τyy(χ|t < t)dµ(χ|t < t) = G∫
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v) Resource feasibility is met: AKαL1−α = C + qM + G, where C =
∫
X c(χ)dµ(χ), M =∫
X m(χ)dµ(χ)
Optimal Policies
Consumption and Medical Services
The first order conditions when si,t > 0 imply the following conditions for optimal policies.
I omit the i indexes below for simplicity, and to save notation I normalize w = 1. Absent
health insurance, the Euler equation for consumption is:
uc,t = (1 + r)βEuc,t+1 + ζa (1.3)
From the FOCs on medical treatment, when st > 0, the following equation describes the




ξx,t + βE(1− st+1)ξx,t+1 = ζx,t (1.4)
Lastly, the implied relationship between health and consumption is also dynamic because
of the dynamic nature of x and a:
ux,t + (zt − q) [uc,t + q(1 + r)βE(1− st+1)uc,t+1] = ζx,t (1.5)
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where ζa,t and ζx,t are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the borrowing constraint and the
upper bound on health, and ξx,t is the shadow value of health in period t.
In the case of bad health shocks, individuals can pay to reposition themselves on a
good earnings path. For high productivity individuals, the marginal cost of treatment is
overcompensated by the immediate productivity gain. Since this happens within the period,
they can afford to get treatment. For other workers, their productivity is low when compared
to the cost of treatment. There are future benefits from treatment - such as entering the
next period with higher health, which increases their expected earnings - but if they hit the
borrowing constraint, they will not be able to get the optimal level of treatment.
Even if experiencing a low productivity period, the asset rich have enough of a buffer to
allow them to pay this cost and regain their earnings path. Consumption is less sensible to
shocks for high levels of accumulates assets. When the level of accumulated assets is low, the
marginal utility of consumption is high, and so consumption is a steep function of wealth.
In these cases, the optimal choice of medical treatment may imply incomplete recovery, even
though maximum recovery would imply higher expected earnings in the future.
We can go an extra step, including the Euler equation for consumption (1.3) in equation
(1.5):
ux,t + ztuc,t + q(1 + r)βE(1− st+1)uc,t+1 = quc,t + ζx
This means that the optimal level of health depends positively on the current marginal
utility from health, the current productivity of health, valued according to the marginal
utility of consumption; and the expected marginal gain in future consumption from health
as an input in the production of health the next period. The marginal cost is related to the
value of the foregone consumption that allows investment in health in the current period.
Borrowing constraints and uncertain earnings imply an inefficiently high level of savings.
Some individuals who receive a negative earnings shock would like to borrow to smooth
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consumption but they are constrained. Consumption is a concave function of income, and
the propensity to consume out of wealth is higher for richer individuals.
Insurance Decision
In this setting, private health insurance works as a trade-off between two different tech-
nologies to access health care. Individuals without health insurance pay the market price
q for medical services, and have no fixed costs associated with their health. On the other
hand, individuals who contract a health insurance plan pay a discounted price (1 − γ)q for
medical services, and have a fixed cost, which is the tax deductible insurance premium. In
the individual’s problem, the decision to contract health insurance is a static choice for an
eligible individual, so it can be solved within the period. Also, the relevant “technology”
to buy medical services will only appear in their budget constraint. Therefore, the optimal
choice of technology can be studied as a function of the optimal policies under each case
(insurance vs no insurance). The following standard result can be readily derived.
There is a cutoff value m for medical services that determines the health insurance deci-
sion by an individual. Health insurance is always rejected when the level of optimal medical
services for any realization of the health shock st is too low: maxstm
∗
t (at, xt; zt, st) ≤ m.
Figure 1.7 shows a graphical proof of this result.
total payment for m no insurance (qm)




Figure 1.7: Optimal health insurance choice depends on optimal level of medical care
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1.4 Calibration
The calibration strategy is as follows. First, a number of parameters are taken directly
from the literature or set equal to their direct empirical counterparts. Second, parameters
describing the process of health shocks are estimated directly from the data. Finally, the key
parameters describing the interaction between health and income are calibrated to match
some of the key data moments. Appendix A.3 describes the computational algorithm used
to solve the model.
1.4.1 Parameters Set Outside of the Model
Preferences and time
Individuals in the model are born at age 25, retirement happens at age 65, and they live
until age T = 85. The model time period is 10 years.30




I assume imperfect substitutability between consumption and health to capture the instru-
mental role of health that goes beyond its effect on productivity. Absent mortality in the
model, this captures the vital role of health status. Non-separability between consumption
and health is consistent with the empirical evidence that finds an effect of health on the
marginal utility of consumption.31
I set a coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 0.9 and an annual discount rate β of 0.975.
30Due to the dynamics of health, treatment and medical conditions, studying the evolution of variables at
a low frequency serves better the objective of the model. All reported parameter values are annual, and are
adjusted to account for the longer period like in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).
31See ? and Palumbo (1999).
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Taxes
Payroll tax rates are set to equal their counterparts in the U.S.: social security tax rate is
τss = 10.4% and Medicare tax rate is τMC = 2.9%. The income tax rate is set to τy= 15%,
which corresponds to the average tax rate in the U.S. in 2008.
Production function
I assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function: Y = KαL1−α, with α = 0.36.
Health-related variables
I assume initial health is 1 for everyone. As explained in section 1.3.1, xt ∈ (0, 1] since
medical treatment does not enhance health in absence of an adverse health shock. I assume
the flow of healthy time is given by n(xi,t) = xi,t.
I compute health shocks as described in section 1.2.2. I measure the probability 1 − π
of receiving a bad health shock (st|st > 0). I compute the empirical distribution of health
shocks directly from the data for each of six age groups, as shown in figure 1.5. I approximate
this distribution of shocks with 3 states for each age group.
Health insurance
In the model, agents are randomly eligible for private health insurance. The probability that
they become eligible at the beginning of their lives is correlated with their initial distribution
of productivity. I calibrate this initial-productivity dependent probability to match the
probability of being eligible for private health insurance by deciles of earnings in MEPS,
which is shown in figure 1.8.
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Figure 1.8: Access to employer-sponsored health insurance by deciles of earnings
The parameter for coinsurance is taken to be 1 minus the average fraction of medical
expenditures γ that the insurance pays. In MEPS, the insurance company covers on average
70% of total medical expenses (including medical services and prescription drugs).
The annual Medicare premium for Part B was $1,156.8 in 2008, and average earnings in
2008 were $41,325, so I set pMediCare to be 2.8% of mean earnings.
Process for productivity
The process for the exogenous productivity is of the form:
log(zi,t) = αi + g(t) + z̃i,t−1 + εi,t
where
z̃i,t = ρz̃i,t−1 + ηi,t
ηit ∼ N(0, ση)
εi,t ∼ N(0, σε)
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and g(t) is a deterministic age productivity profile.32
I take from Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) the variance of the productivity fixed
effect σ2α = 0.21 and the variance of the transitory shock σ
2
ε = 0.06.
33 The remaining param-
eters from the latent productivity process ρ and ση are calibrated. Since effective earnings
in this model are a function of health as well as productivity, the model generates a different
observed persistence and variance of shocks than the original process for productivity shocks
it is fed, so the calibrated value of ρ is lower than the estimate in the literature.
Following the life cycle literature, the age productivity profile g(t) is taken from Hansen
(1993). This index is interpolated to in-between years, normalized to average one during the
working life, and takes the values displayed in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Deterministic age labor-efficiency profile, from Hansen (1993)
age group g(t)
25-34 years old 0.9249
35-44 years old 1.0328
45-54 years old 1.0559
55-64 years old 0.9865
1.4.2 Parameters Calibrated to Match Moments from the Data
The calibrated parameters are the weight of health in the utility function λ, the unit price
of medical treatment q, and the persistence ρ and variance σ2η of the persistent productivity
shock. The values are shown in table 1.2.
32Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2009) show that under certain assumptions the quantitative and theoretical
implications of using these exogenous efficiency weights are the same as if the human capital accumulation
were endogenously generated by on-the-job training à la Ben-Porath.
33To adjust the periodicity of the stochastic variables to that of the model, I follow Livshits, MacGee, and
Tertilt (2007).
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To calibrate these values, I match the moments in table 1.3, which are the slope of
the health status profile over the life cycle, the average medical spending with respect to
average earnings for workers (individuals in productive life), the average medical spending
of retirees with respect to average earnings, the autocorrelation of residual log-earnings, and
the variance of residual log-earnings.
Table 1.2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
λworker Weight of health in utility, young 0.63
λretired Weight of health in utility, retired 0.5
q Price of medical treatment 0.016
ρ Persistence of productivity shock (annual) 0.93
σ2η Variance of innovation to productivity shock 0.18
(*) Values for annual frequency
Table 1.3: Matched moments
Moment Data Model
mean(xt−1)/mean(x1) 1.10 1.10
mean(qmworking age)/mean(yworking age) 0.147 0.14
mean(qmretired)/mean(yworking age) 0.25 0.22
autocorr(log yres) 0.967 0.96
var(log yres) 9.566 9.53
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1.5 Numerical Results
Table 1.4 shows how the model performs with respect to some moments not used in the cal-
ibration. The model under-predicts the fraction of people who buy private health insurance.
This is a natural outcome given that there is only one type of health insurance contract
in the model, while there are several types of health insurance contracts in reality, which
offer different degrees of coverage and imply different costs for individuals. The value to the
consumer may differ across these types of contracts because there are many nuances in the
health insurance market that are not captured by this model. The model generates slightly
stronger correlation between health and earnings than the data on residual earnings and
residual health.
Table 1.4: Performance with respect to other moments (not used to calibrate the parameters)
Moment Data Model
Health insurance premium 0.085 0.06
Med.Exp. Uninsured





Avg. health, working age 0.81 0.86
Avg. health, retired 0.70 0.73
Corr(health, earnings) 0.14 0.17
Figure 1.9 shows the evolution of health, consumption, medical spending as fraction of
earnings, and assets over the working life, as generated by the model and in the data. The
points over the life cycle are indicated by the midrange of the age group. For example, in
the graphs, the age group labeled as 30 indicates the group aged 25 to 34 years old.
As in the data, the model predicts that medical expenditures increase over the life cycle,
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and health monotonously deteriorates with age. The model replicates the concave profile of
consumption and the increasing profile of assets. After retirement, consumption goes down
and assets are run down. The model does not incorporate any bequest motives, so all agents
have zero level of assets by the end of their lives.


























































































Figure 1.9: Life cycle profiles of health, medical spending (as fraction of earnings), assets and
consumption
37
1.5.1 Dynamics of Health and Earnings Inequality over the Life
Cycle
It is interesting to check how the model performs in terms of the joint evolution of health
and earnings over the life cycle. Figure 1.10 shows the evolution of the average level of
health by earnings deciles and age groups. The left panel is the outcome from the model,
while the right panel shows the data. We see that the model reproduces a few facts from
the data: the health of those in the top decile of earnings remains high during the entire life
cycle, the difference in average health between those in the deciles six and ten of earnings is
not too high, and individuals with low earnings have much lower average health than those
with higher earnings. The model predicts a more abrupt deterioration in average health of
individuals in the second decile of earnings, and too little difference between health of those
in the sixth decile versus those in the tenth decile of earnings.




































Figure 1.10: Health by percentiles of earnings and age, model (left) and data (right)
When comparing the model output to the data, it is important to keep in mind that there
are sources of insurance that the model does not include, like Medicaid for the very poor
and support that may come from relatives inside or outside the household. Also, the model
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assumes that everyone works as much as they can, given their health status, whereas it is
possible that I have not been able to exclude from the sample all the people who are earning
less than their market potential for reasons other than health. These aspects can help explain
the differences between the model and the data, especially for the poorest individuals.
1.5.2 Health as Determinant of Earnings Dynamics
This model provides a way to compute how much of the dynamics of the earnings process
is accounted for by the health channel. The first result along this dimension concerns the
dispersion of earnings. As it was discussed in section 1.2, the interaction between health
and productivity shocks generates extra dispersion over what comes from the productivity
process. Figure 1.11 shows the ratio of the coefficient of variation of earnings to the coefficient
of variation of the exogenous productivity process in the model for all age groups. The
dispersion of the residual earnings profile is amplified on average by 5% over the life cycle.
The peak of this amplification happens for the group of workers in their last working period
before retirement, when it is 8.2%.







Figure 1.11: Additional earnings inequality due to health channel
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The biggest effect of absence of health shocks happens at the bottom of the earnings
distribution: Earnings of the first decile of earnings distribution are 120% higher in an
economy with productivity shocks alone. In such an economy, earnings of the bottom half
of the earnings distribution are 40% higher. Given these figures, non-surprisingly, the 90/10
ratio declines by 71% but the 90/50 ratio declines only by 4%. The coefficient of variation
declines by 13% when shocks to health are removed from the model.
The second result about the characteristics of the earnings dynamics concerns the persis-
tence of the productivity process. The observed persistence of residual earnings can be mea-
sured through the autocorrelation coefficient of the process, which is 0.989. The calibrated
persistence of the productivity process is much lower, with an autocorrelation coefficient of
0.92. The difference in persistence between these two processes can be better assessed com-
puting the half life of a shock. In the case of residual earnings, the half life of the process
is 62.6 years, whereas for the productivity process it is only 8.31 years. This is difference
indicates that health risk is an important determinant of lifetime risk.
1.5.3 Effect of early shocks
Differences in innate productivity Early shocks are amplified over the life cycle. Since
low earning workers can afford less medical care in case of bad health shocks, this implies that
health insurance makes a larger difference for these workers than for high earning individuals.
Early health shocks When the worker receives a bad health shock early in life, it implies
lower earnings on average over the life (see table 1.5).
There is a difference in outcomes between a worker who gets hit by a bad health shock
early in life by the insurance status at the time. There is a 22% difference in expected
lifetime utility by insurance status, conditional on getting hit by bad health shock in first
period.
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Table 1.5: Effect of early health shocks: average shock
Earnings
On average -5.6%
1st quintile of earn. distr. -7.3%




In this section, I study the implications for earnings distribution and for other variables like
consumption, health, and earnings, of policies that affect different components of access to
health care. Exploiting the interaction between health and earnings in the model, I also use
it to look at the redistributive effects of these health care policies. The policy experiments
studied here address different aspects of health insurance. The ingredients of health insurance
in the model are eligibility, insurance premium, and coinsurance rate, and in this section I
focus on eligibility and insurance premium. The set of exercises is laid out in increasing
degrees of policy effectiveness for increasing access to health insurance.
These experiments provide insight on the effects of some of the key components of the
health care reform law signed in 2010 as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
While the model is not designed to incorporate all of the changes that this reform puts
in place, it is adequate to study the effectiveness and consequences of policies aiming at
increasing health insurance coverage. And one of the goals of the 2010 health care reform
is to increase the number of people covered with health insurance. Amongst other aspects
of the reform, new insurance regulations aim to achieve this. The Affordable Care Act
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implements measures to increase access to health insurance. One such measure is to forbid
insurance companies to deny coverage due to pre-existing conditions. This allows everyone to
be able to enter a health insurance contract with an insurance company. In order to prevent
the market from breaking down due to adverse selection, the law puts in place an individual
mandate by which every individual must acquire some health insurance plan. Lastly, in
order to make this requirement feasible for everyone, the Affordable Care Act will provide
low income households with financial support to buy health insurance.
The first exercise studies the effects of generalizing access to health insurance, in the
sense that everyone is eligible to buy private health insurance. This experiment goes in line
with one goals of the Affordable Care Act, which is to expand coverage providing individuals
with new insurance opportunities, although the exercise does not incorporate all of the
mechanisms the Affordable Care Act puts into place to achieve this.
The second exercise also targets an expansion of health insurance, but through a subsidy
to the health insurance premium. The Affordable Care Act will also provide individuals
and families with financial support to buy health insurance. Tax credits for the purchase of
insurance, also called subsidies, will be available to people based on their income.
The third experiment studies one particular instance of universal health care: health
insurance is provided by the government but individuals pay a coinsurance rate just like in
the private health insurance case. This would work as a plain subsidy of medical services.
The results of these policy experiments are explained below.34
1.6.1 General Access to Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
In this exercise, I study the case where everyone is allowed to purchase the private health
insurance plan. But workers still decide in each period whether they want to purchase it or
34This version of policy exercises is computed in partial equilibrium. I am currently working on the general
equilibrium version of the experiments.
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not. Table 1.6 below shows the results of this policy. Access to health insurance affects the
entire life cycle path of outcomes.




lifetime consumption of the newly included in ESHI +2.0%
lifetime health of the newly included in ESHI +3.5%
lifetime earnings of the newly included in ESHI +2.5%
variance of earnings of newly included in ESHI -1.01%
90/10 earnings ratio -14%
As a counterfactual exercise, figure 1.12 shows the life cycle evolution of earnings disper-
sion for the group of people who were denied access to health insurance in the benchmark
model. The figure shows two paths, everything else constant: one path corresponds to the
no eligible for health insurance case, and the other corresponds to the case when there is
general access to the health insurance option.
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Figure 1.12: Dispersion of earnings for the group of ineligible for insurance, when ineligible (bench-
mark) and when made eligible (counterfactual)
It is worth noting that a fraction of people within this group will not accept health
insurance in the general access case, so the aggregate differences in the group are derived
from those who do contract health insurance. The lower dispersion in earnings is a result
not only of better health outcomes. The lifetime correlation between earnings and health
goes down from .202 to .195 with generalized voluntary access to health insurance.
1.6.2 Private Health Insurance Subsidies
An individual mandate seeks to achieve large coverage in the population by making health
insurance compulsory. This can be accompanied by subsidies for the premium or not. The
Affordable Care Act puts in place an individual mandate with subsidized health insurance
premium.
In the context of the model, I have shown in the previous section that the take up rate
of the only health insurance plan is lower than 100% when everybody is eligible for private
insurance. This implies that putting in place an individual mandate without subsidizing
the health insurance premium would impose a disutility cost on those who find it optimal
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to pass on the health insurance being offered to them. Additionally, given that there is no
adverse selection in the model, nobody would have a utility gain from an individual mandate.
Therefore, its effects are limited.
For these reasons, I study the role of another component of the Affordable Care Act
that is complementary to the individual mandate, which is the subsidies to health insurance
premium. I fist study the effectiveness of a flat subsidy to achieve larger coverage, and then
I will make subsidies depend on income levels.
In the model, a subsidy of 50% the insurance premium drives the take-up rate to 89%
and reduces the 90/10 earnings ratio by 18.5%. The young and those at the bottom of the
earnings distribution are most likely to pass on insurance and remain uninsured. In order to
achieve 100% coverage, the subsidy rate must be of 78%.
1.6.3 Universal Health Care
In this exercise, I assume a form of universal health care that consists on government-
sponsored health insurance for everyone. Everyone has access to health insurance and no
premium payment is required. Individuals pay coinsurance for the medical services they
consume, and the government covers the rest. This system works in practice just as if the
government provided a subsidy for all medical services.
I assume this form of universal health care is put in place, financed through proportional
taxation. The coinsurance rate is the same as in the private health insurance case of the
benchmark model.
As a result of this policy, there are positive effects in health and consumption: Average
health goes up by 4.4%, and average consumption goes up by 0.05% (average consumption
goes up for the bottom 50 percentiles or the earnings distribution, and it goes down slightly
for the top 50 percentiles of the earnings distribution). Average medical expenditures also
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increase by 5.4% and average earnings increase by 1.63%.
The main effect of equal access to subsidized medical treatment for everyone is that the
connection between health outcomes and earnings is weakened. The correlation between
health status and earnings is 0.1781 on average across age groups, while it was 0.2025 in the
benchmark model.
In terms of welfare, the utilitarian measure of welfare indicates that welfare goes up by
1.02 percent. The largest increase in welfare amongst age groups occurs for the 45-54 age
group, that experiences an increase of 1.23 percent with respect to the benchmark economy.
Utility goes up for everyone below the 90 percentile of the earnings distribution.
1.7 Robustness
1.7.1 Health in the Utility Function
I explore in this exercise what are the effects of not including health as an argument in
the utility function. If I remove health from the utility function of the retirees, by setting
λretired = 0, then there is no motive for the retirees to buy any kind of medical services. This
would be counterfactual.
If I remove health from the utility function of the workers, by setting λworker = 0, then
the effect of health becomes more similar to a human capital model, and there is a point
of optimal disinvestment in human capital-producing health before it renders useless at the
retirement age. Therefore, the profile of medical expenditures would be concave instead of
convex. This would be counterfactual. This is consistent with findings in Halliday, He, and
Zhang (2011). Figure 1.13 illustrates the case with both λworker = 0 and λretired = 0.
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Figure 1.13: Life cycle profile of medical expenditures, λ = 0 case.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I have incorporated health risk into an income fluctuation model of the life
cycle with heterogeneous agents and idiosyncratic uncertainty. In the model, agents choose
consumption, medical services and health insurance. Access to health care is affected by
income and wealth, but earnings are affected by health shocks. Thus, the model includes
interactions between health and earnings consistent with findings from empirical studies.
I estimated the process for shocks to health directly from survey data, and calibrated the
model using disaggregated data on medical expenditures, health status and earnings. I used
the calibrated model to study the role of health in generating earnings inequality over the
life cycle, and to evaluate alternative health policy interventions.
I find that the health channel explains around 9% of the increase in earnings dispersion
over the life cycle. Also, the interaction between health and earnings increases the persistence
of the effects from all shocks: productivity, health and insurance eligibility. I find that
the accumulation of bad shocks in both health and productivity dimensions translates in
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a low health outcome in some states. This low level of health is carried on to the next
period, propagating the persistence of productivity shocks and increasing the persistence
of the earnings process. Therefore, the interaction between health and earnings can create
low earnings-low health outcomes since most additional dispersion in earnings and health
happens at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
The policy exercises imply that health care policies that increase health insurance cov-
erage or provide subsidized health care have redistributive consequences because they can
affect and prevent the poverty traps aforementioned. Subsidies are needed to achieve larger
effects in terms of coverage, because even facilitating access to health insurance for everyone
would leave 18% of individuals not contracting health insurance. Therefore it is only through
a subsidized premium that greater coverage be achieved. The main redistributive effect of
these health care policies is through increasing the earnings of the lower ability-lower health
workers. Subsidized expansions of health insurance would mostly benefit those at the bottom
of the earnings distribution.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and Household Labor
Supply
Stefania Albanesi and Maŕıa José Prados
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2.1 Introduction
The entry of married women into the labor market and the rise in women’s relative earnings
are amongst the most notable economic phenomena of the twentieth century.1 These phe-
nomena were particularly pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, when full year participation
of married women grew from 38% in 1975 to a peak of 60% in 1996 and the male to female
ratio in hourly wages dropped from 1.60 to 1.34. Since then, these indicators have stalled, as
shown in figure 2.1. Moreover, figure 2.2 illustrates that this development is particularly pro-
nounced for college workers. The gender wage gap of college workers has not been lower than
1.41 since 1991. These observations are puzzling in light of the continued rise in women’s












































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Gender wage gap Female labor force participation rate
Gender wage gap is computed as mean wage of male workers over mean wage
of female workers for full time, full year workers
The values are three−year moving averages.
Gender Wage Gap and Female LFP, married workers
Source: March Supplement of CPS
Figure 2.1: Gender wage gap and female labor force participation
In this paper, we propose a mechanism that links the decline in married women’s par-
ticipation and relative wages compared to trend since the early 1990s to the growth of the
skill premium, which substantially accelerated in those years. The main goal of this paper is
1 For reference, see Goldin (2006).
2 For a reference on women’s educational investments, see Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006). For a















































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Gender wage gap Female labor force participation rate
Gender wage gap is computed as mean wage of male workers over mean wage
of female workers for full time, full year workers
Three−year moving averages
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Gender wage gap Female labor force participation rate
Gender wage gap is computed as mean wage of male workers over mean wage
of female workers for full time, full year workers
Three−year moving averages
High school or less
Gender Wage Gap and Female LFP, married workers
Source: March Supplement of CPS
Figure 2.2: Gender wage gap and female labor force participation, by education
to document empirical evidence on married women’s labor force participation by education,
earnings and education of their husband, and to explore this mechanism quantitatively with
a simulated model.
The left panel of figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the skill or college premium by gender,
measured as the ratio of average wages for college to non-college full time, full year workers.
There has been a greater rise in skill premium for male college graduates than for female
college graduates. The skill premium rose by 13% from 1.73 to 1.96 between 1993 and 2005
for men, while only by 8% from 1.56 to 1.69 for women over the same period. This difference
has accelerated from the mid 1990s on, and has resulted in a sharp rise in the male to female
ratio of the skill premium starting in 1993, as shown on the right panel of figure 2.3.
Our hypothesis is that the rise in skill premium can explain the lack of convergence in both
participation and wages across genders since the early 1990s. Specifically, the rise in the skill
premium increases earnings for married skilled men and generates a negative wealth effect
on participation and market hours for their wives. Positive assortative matching implies that
this channel disproportionally affects skilled women. The decline in their attachment to the









1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
College Premium, Males College Premium, Females
Premium is computed as mean wage of college workers over mean wage






























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Rolling three years average
all fulltime workers
Ratio of Male to Female Skill Premium
Source: March Supplement of CPS
Figure 2.3: Evolution of skill premium by gender, full time-full year workers, regardless of marital
status.
Note: Skill premium is the ratio of mean hourly wages between workers with college degree and
those without a college degree. The data are pooled using three-year centered moving averages.
dampening the growth in the skill premium for women relative to men.
Disaggregated evidence on married women’s participation provides strong descriptive
support for this hypothesis. As shown in figure 2.4, the flattening of labor force participation
starting in the early 1990s is limited to married women. Participation of single women has
been mostly stable throughout the sample period. Participation of married women differs by
education level: while for married women with high school, participation slows down during
the 1990s but stays mostly constant, participation for married women with college declines
from 79% to 75% between 1995 and 2011.
Some recent literature has noted the slow down of female labor force participation rates in
the U.S.. Blau and Kahn (2013) study the fall in female labor supply in the U.S. compared to
other OECD countries, and find that 28% of the difference can be attributable to differences
in “family-friendly” policies. Our analysis is complementary to this in that it focuses on a
different aspect of household labor decisions, but it has to do with gender differences in career






















































































































Female	  Labor	  Force	  Par8cipa8on	  Rate	  
Unmarried,	  College	   Unmarried,	  High	  school	   Married,	  College	   Married,	  High	  school	  
Source: Monthly waves of CPS
Figure 2.4: Monthly female labor force participation rates by marital status and education
marriage formation and female labor force participation decisions. They find that couples
where the woman has higher earnings potential than the man are less likely to get married,
and that within couples, if the wife’s potential income (based on her demographics) is likely
to exceed the husband’s, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than
her potential if she does work. Marriage choices and household formation decisions are an
interesting avenue to understand this phenomenon. We study the optimal dynamic response
for couples who are already formed.
Our analysis has two components: one empirical and one theoretical. The empirical
analysis extensively documents the behavior of labor force participation and wages of married
women in relation to the earnings of their husbands by characteristics of the household and
educational attainment of the spouses. A first contribution of this paper is that it presents
novel evidence on female labor market outcomes, the determinants of household income
inequality, and its relation to individual income dispersion. The theoretical analysis is based
on a general equilibrium quantitative model of household labor supply, a stylized version
of Chiappori (1992). Such a model can qualitatively reproduce a negative effect on wives’
participation of a rise in husbands’ earnings with a standard preference specification that
allows for wealth effects on labor supply. Existing studies of earnings inequality either
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restrict attention to males or abstract completely from the household structure. A second
contribution of this paper is the theoretical analysis, which comprises the first attempt to
build a quantitative model linking the rise in skill premia and wage inequality for highly
educated workers to the recent trends in female labor force participation and gender wage
inequality. We calibrate the distribution of wages by education and gender and the degree of
assortative matching is calibrated to match the distribution of household income and spousal
earnings and wives’ labor force participation by household type in the US economy in 1990,
and conduct several experiments to gauge the quantitative relevance of our hypothesis and
possible alternatives.
Section 2.2 presents the empirical analysis and the main facts and section 2.3 presents
the model. The calibration of the model and the numerical exercises are in section 2.4, and
section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
2.2.1 Data and sample
We use monthly waves of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1975-2011 and matched
waves from the March Supplement of the CPS.3 The public use CPS is a large nationally
representative sample of households. Our sample focuses on adults aged between 21 and 65,
all races, and comprises approximately from 23,000 to 35,000 households per year (which
translates into 45,700 to 70,600 observations per year).
To study different aspects of the data, we use sub-samples where we condition on marital
status and work status. The married category includes everyone who declares to be married
with spouse present. With respect to participation in the labor force, in the motivational
3 The data was obtained from the IPUMS .
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evidence we use monthly data on participation. In the empirical analysis and calibration, we
use a measure of labor force participation throughout the year. For this measure, we define
people as participating in the labor force if they have been employed and/or actively seeking
employment during at least 45 weeks that year.
We divide the population in two education categories: high school indicates all education
levels less than college degree, and college includes those who obtained a college degree or
higher.
To protect the confidentiality of its respondents, the U.S. Census Bureau censors the
income of individuals above specified topcoded levels in the public use March CPS data.
This peculiarity of the data must be taken into account when using the CPS to address
questions regarding earnings dispersion, since inconsistent topcode levels lead to artificial
increases or decreases in mean incomes as different fractions of the population are subject to
topcoding each year. The CPS has introduced different topcodes during the sample period,
and the methodology about the treatment of topcoded observations has changed a few times.
Namely, the 1990 IPUMS is topcoded at $140,000 with higher earnings amounts replaced
with state medians. After 1995, instead of one uniform value for all topcoded observations,
the most recent topcode categories replace topcoded earnings with average earnings across
gender-race-work experience cells. These changes in methodology complicate the estimation
of properties of the distribution of earnings over time. To address this concern, for surveys
before 1995, we replace the topcoded values with the gender-race-work status cell means
estimated by Larrimore et al. (2008). This way, we use their cell means series in conjunction
with cell means provided by the Census Bureau for later years to create a complete set of
cell means from 1976-2008.
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2.2.2 Measuring the phenomenon
We document a break in the increasing trend for the labor force participation rate of some
married women during the early 1990s. The rate of labor force participation of married
women increased up until this point, but it did not converge to that of single women within
the same education group. Moreover, this lack of convergence is more noticeable for women
with college degree. The rate of labor force participation for single women with less than
college was 10 percentage points higher than for married women in this group in 1993, and
this difference came down to only 5 percentage points in 2011, whereas the participation
rate of single women with college or more remained 10 percentage points higher than that
of married women with college from 1993 until 2011.
There are several factors that have contributed to an increasing rate of labor force partic-
ipation of married women over the last few decades. We capture these factors by estimating
a common time trend in the evolution of female participation for the period before the ob-
served change in trend. For this, we estimate two specifications of probit models of female
labor force participation in order to quantify this phenomenon.
To assess the quantitative relevance of our proposed explanatory mechanism, we proceed
as follows. We estimate a trend on 1975-1992 data for the skill premium by gender, and
labor force participation of married individuals by education and by household type. We
then extrapolate the trend to the years 1993-2008. Finally, we consider the difference between
the actual values of each variable for the period 1995-2005 and the predicted values, based on
the estimated trend. This gives us a measure of the change in the behavior of the variables
of interest in the period 1992-2008. The results from this procedure are displayed in Table
2.1.
The skill premium for married men was 1.86, 11 percentage points higher than predicted
by its prevailing trend in the period 1975-1992, whereas the skill premium for married women
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was only 4 percentage points higher than the predicted value, 1.60. Correspondingly, the
gender wage gap for college graduates was 14 percentage points higher in the data, with
male/female wages at 1.46 on average in 1995-2005, then predicted from 1975-1992 behavior.
Participation of married women was 0.61 on average during 1995-2005, while it was predicted
to be 0.67 based on 1975-1992 data. The difference between predicted and actual values for
the 1995-2005 average are higher for women with college husband than for women with high
school husbands, and for women with college relative to those with high school.





Male Female HS College Aggregate
HS College HS College
Husbands Husbands Women Women
1991 1.62 1.53 1.33 1.40 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.63
1993 1.77 1.58 1.29 1.45 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.66
Actual Average 1995-2005 1.86 1.64 1.29 1.46 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.65
Predicted Average 1995-2005 1.75 1.60 1.19 1.32 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.63 0.74
Actual - Predicted 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.14 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09
Actual - Predicted (as %) 6.29 2.5 8.4 10.61 -8.9 -8.9 -14.0 -9.5 -12.1
Next, to verify the source of this divergence between actual and projected values, we
estimate a probit model of labor force participation of married women that allows for time
dummies instead of linear trend, and for the effects of own education and husband’s earnings
to vary over time. Figure 2.5 shows the coefficients for dummies indicating time, college
degree, and husband whose earnings are above the 90th percentile of the distribution.
The underlying trend that drives female participation continues to rise after 1992. What
changes since the early 1990s was the college effect and the “rich husband” effect. The college
dummy for participation went down from an average of 0.3 in the 1980s to an average of
0.2 in the late 1990s and 2000s. The “rich husband” dummy always has a negative effect on
wives’ participation. However, this negative effect became weaker up until 1990, and then
it stopped improving. What we observe in the data with respect to the behavior of college




































































The skill premium has risen over the entire sample period. However, the growth rate of the
skill premium for married male workers has been higher than for the rest of the workers since
early 1990s. As seen in the previous section, in figure 2.3, skill premium is always higher
for male than for female workers. But in particular, the growth rate of skill premium for
married male workers accelerated in the early 1990s more than for married female workers.
For single workers, the evolution of the skill premium by gender seems to follow the same
growth path. In figure 2.6, skill premia were computed as the ratio of mean hourly wages
between workers with college degree and those without a college degree, for full-time and
full-year workers.
The rise in the skill premium for men is also associated with a sharp rise in earnings
dispersion in the top 50% of the earnings distribution over the same period, as can be seen
in figure 2.7. The smaller rise in earnings dispersion for women over the same period has
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Figure 2.6: Skill premium by gender and marital status
Note: Normalized to equal 100 in 1990.
Female labor force participation by household characteristics
It is important to consider household characteristics in order to better understand the ob-
served behavior of labor force participation of married women. Husband’s earnings are
important determinants of wives’ participation in the labor force, and we have shown that
there has been a significant increase in dispersion of husbands’ earnings. But there are other
factors that also influence labor force participation. In this subsection, we document the
trends for several factors in order to rule out a major influence of any aspect other than
husbands’ earnings potential.
The role of earnings of the husband and education Figure 2.8 shows the labor force
participation rate of women by their husband’s decile in the male earnings distribution. The
wives of higher earning husbands are much less likely to work than the wives of lower earning
husbands.
Figure 2.9 shows the average household income by education types of household over
the years, for male-only earner households (left panel) and for two-earner households (right
















Figure 2.7: Earning dispersion at the top half of the earnings distribution, by gender.




















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
1st decile 5th and 6th deciles 10th decile
by deciles of husband’s earnings distribution
Female participation rate
Figure 2.8: Labor force participation of married women by characteristics.
male-earner only households for all education types, except for the college husband- high
school wife type which has grown at approximately the same rate for both types of house-
holds.
Figure 2.10 shows the average wage of the husband for the same groups of households
as figure 2.9. Figure 2.10 clearly shows that husband’s average wages are much higher in
male-earner only households than in two-earner households for all years and education types.























































Average income, two−earner households


































Average wage of husband, two−earner households
Figure 2.10: Average wage of husbands by household types
To test this hypothesis, table 2.2 shows the results from estimating a maximum likelihood
probit model of labor force participation of wives. The controls are age, own education and
cross effect of own education and husband’s percentile of earnings. Table 2.2 shows evidence
of significant cross income effects of husband’s earnings on labor force participation decision
of the wives.
Table 2.3 summarizes the information on husband wages for the two time periods in
our quantitative analysis below. The most salient facts of this table are the following: The
average wage of the husband in one-earner households is higher than the average wage of
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Table 2.2: Sensitivity of female labor participation to husband’s earnings bracket
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
age 0.0060 0.0002 32.11 0.00 0.006 0.006
education years 0.0900 0.0011 81.97 0.00 0.088 0.092
degree 0.1930 0.0112 17.30 0.00 0.171 0.215
degreeXperc25 -0.2111 0.0169 -12.46 0.00 -0.244 -0.178
degreeXperc50 -0.2820 0.0127 -22.12 0.00 -0.307 -0.257
degreeXperc75 -0.4821 0.0135 -35.68 0.00 -0.509 -0.456
degreeXperc90 -0.8764 0.0120 -72.78 0.00 -0.900 -0.853
constant -1.1311 0.0157 -72.19 0.00 -1.162 -1.100
Table 2.3: Average wage of husband, by household types
One-earner Two-earner One-earner hh/
Period households households Two-earner hh
1976-1993
No College - No College 18.8 16.1 117%
No Coll Husb - Coll Wife 22.1 17.1 129%
College Husb - No Coll Wife 29.7 23.0 129%
College - College 31.2 24.1 130%
1994-2008
No College - No College 19.4 18.0 108%
No Coll Husb - Coll Wife 25.2 20.0 126%
College Husb - No Coll Wife 38.5 29.0 133%
College - College 44.7 33.1 135%
the husband in two-earner households for all education pairs matchings. The percentage
difference between the average wage of the husband in one and two-earner households is
smaller after 1994 than in the previous period for high school husbands, and larger for
college husbands. This means that non college degree men in one and two-earner households
have become less different in this last period, whereas college degree men in two earner
households are further apart, in terms of earnings, from those in one-earner households now
than what they were before 1994.
Figure 2.11 shows the labor force participation rates of married women, by household
education types. The graph shows the rates relative to 1993. There is a steep increase in
participation until 1993, and after that there is a change in trend for all married women,
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regardless of education level. However, the slow down is more pronounced for married women
with college degree, since the slope during the previous decades was steeper than for women
without college. The participation of women married to a college degree husband stopped
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Figure 2.11: Evolution of the annual labor force participation of married women by education of
the couple.
Note: Annual labor force participation rate refers to women who are part of the labor force all year
long. Index =100 in 1993
The role of fertility Another potential explanation to the observed behavior of married
women’s labor force participation could be connected to changes in fertility. Women with
children are less likely to participate in the labor force, and hence increases in fertility could
affect labor force participation of married women. However, we can rule out this explanation
as the only cause of the observed behavior of female labor force participation. As shown in
figure 2.12, the decline in the growth rate of labor force participation was similar for women
with and without children. Most importantly, the evolution in the labor force participation
of married women depends on the characteristics of their spouse, since the decline in the
rate of growth of participation was largest for women married to men in the 90th percentile
of the earnings distribution, followed by those married to men in the 50th percentile and
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in the 10th percentile. We conclude from this evidence that changes in fertility are not the
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Graphs by Wife’s own children in household
by husband’s earnings deciles
Female participation rate
Figure 2.12: Participation of married women by husbands earnings
The evolution of marriage rates Married women represented 72.6% of the population
in 1975, and that fraction went down to 58.9% by 2008 as shown in figure 2.13. This decline
in marriage rates does not come from a higher rate of divorce but from an increase in the
fraction of never married women in the population. The fraction of separated or divorced
women in the population stayed approximately constant during these years, varying between
a minimum of 16.6% in 1975 and a maximum of 19.6% in 1996, declining back again to 18.5%
by 2008. The fraction of women who have never been married has increased from 10.7% in
1975 to 22.4% in 2008. With respect to the composition of the never married, Chiappori,
Salanié, and Weiss (2012) show that younger cohorts of high school dropouts of both genders
have shown a steep decline in marriage rates (compared to older cohorts), followed by high
school graduates. The proportion of women born after 1967 that never married is lower for
people with some college than for groups with less education.
The fraction of women in the population with college degree has increased over the entire



















































































































Separated/Divorced	   Married	   Never	  Married	  
Figure 2.13: Marriage rates in the population
that can be seen in figure 2.14. The fraction of households where both partners have college
degree has increased steadily, but so has the fraction of households where the wife has more












1975	   1980	   1985	   1990	   1995	   2000	   2005	  
college,	  college	   college,	  less	  than	  college	  
less	  than	  college,	  less	  than	  college	   less	  than	  college,	  college	  
Figure 2.14: Fraction of households by education pairs
Note: Household type corresponds to husband-wife educational attainment.
Gender gap in labor force participation by marital status For robustness, we also
look at the labor force participation of women relative to that of married men (single men















Figure 2.15: Labor force participation of single and married women relative to that of married men.
We verify that the change in break for the labor force participation of married women is
also observable using this measure relative to married men. It is not a matter of both men
and women changing by much their labor supply behavior. Figure 2.15 shows this behavior.
It is worth noting that the relative participation of single women has increased time with
respect to that of married men and it has not suffered a break in trend.
Asset accumulation
Figure 2.16 shows the evolution of net worth for households by education types. It is worth
noting that the only household types that display a sustained increase in household net worth
are those households where the husband belongs to the college category. In particular, asset
accumulation of households where both spouses have at least college degree accelerated more
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Source: Survey of Consumer Finances
Figure 2.16: Household Net Worth
2.3 Model
The model is a non-unitary model of household labor supply, where individuals are “egoistic”
and have independent utility functions, but it is assumed that the household decision-making
process is cooperative, so that household decisions are Pareto efficient.4, 5
In this economy there is a continuum of measure one of individuals, and each male
individual is assumed to be married to a female individual. Each of them draw a (permanent)
productivity value θi from their corresponding distributions. The distributions of θis depend
on the individual’s gender and education level. We consider two possible - exogenously given
- education levels: less than college (we call this category high school), and college degree or
more (we call this category college). Therefore, there are four kinds of households defined by
the skill level of the partners: j ∈ J = {hs− hs, hs− coll, coll − hs, coll − coll} (measure




0 µe (em, ef ) = 1). We take the evolution
4 This result can be achieved by an alternative interpretation of this process, namely assuming that there
is a two period decision process, and there is some exogenous sharing rule, given by characteristic of the
marriage contract, for instance.
5 The model is a particular case of the collective labor supply model in Chiappori (1992), where we
assume a fixed household welfare function and bargaining weights for all households, whereas in Chiappori’s
general case, the household welfare function is allowed to depend on prices, and endowments if any.
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of µe over time as exogenous.
The model allows for human capital accumulation in the form of learning by doing (cumu-
lative working experience, non specific, subject to depreciation). This implies that workers
lose skills when they are unemployed or out of the labor force.
Worker i is indexed by gender s = m, f and age j = 1, .., J .
Individual labor earnings yij,t are a function of hours worked (l
i), worker’s stock of human
capital (ki), worker’s skill level (θi), exogenously age-dependent individual productivity -or
efficiency units per hour worked according to market price for skills at time t, wt.
6































We assume the following functional form for the individual utility function of individual of























A household of type i solves the following problem:



















s.t. kij+1 = k
i


















0 if pisj = 0













j + bj for j = 1, 2, ...J − 1
∑
s=f,m
csJ ≤ bJ ,
bj+1 ≥ bj, for j = 1, 2, ...J − 1, and:
ks0 = k
s.
2.3.1 Necessary Conditions for Optimality
The first order necessary conditions for the household problem are:
βjλsuscj = µj (2.2)








)α−1 ≤ 0 (2.3)
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with equality for lsj > l, for j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1,
βjλsusl,j + πjGhs,j ≤ 0 (2.4)
with equality for hsj > 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1,
−qµj + µj+1 = 0,
and




j+1, j) = 0,
for j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1.
The envelope conditions for this problem are:
Vb(b, k
f , km, j) = µj = uc(cj),







f , km, j) = νsj (1− δ) + µjwsjθslsj ,
for s = f,m.
Combining the first order necessary conditions for consumption at any j:
λfufc,j = λ
mumc,j.
At an interior solution with both partners participating in the labor force, the combined first
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This equation, jointly with (2.1), can be used to solve for hsj for s = f,m for given l
s
j , both
for two earner and one earner households.
If psj = 1, then we can combine the first order necessary condition for consumption and











for s = f,m and j = 1, 2, ...J − 1.
For a two earner households, equations (2.5) and (2.6) define a system that can be used
to solve for hsj and l
s
j as a function of cj
s.
For one earner households, assuming that male participation is positive and that hours











while lfj = 0. Then, equation (2.7) jointly with equation (2.5) can be used to solve for h
s
j and
lsj as a function of cj
s.
Finally, combining the first order necessary condition for home and market hours for each
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partner in the labor force at an interior solution, we obtain for j = 1, 2, ...J − 1:





We adopt the following specification for the home production function:






+ (1− ψ) (hm)ρ
]1/ρ
,
for ψ and ρ between 0 and 1. This implies that for 1 > ψ > 0 and ρ < 1, home hours are
always interior for both spouses.
The wealth effects on labor supply can can be analyzed from (2.3). For given female
wages, µj is lower in a household with higher male earnings, causing l
s
j to be lower, other
things equal.




for j = 1, 2, ....J .
Combining the Euler equation for ksj with the corresponding envelope condition, we
obtain:
− νsj + β
[
νsj+1(1− δ) + µj+1wsj+1θslsj+1
]
= 0, (2.9)












νsJ−2(1− δ) + µJ−2wsJ−2θslsJ−2
]
= 0,
and so on for j going to 0 according to (2.9).
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2.3.2 Model properties
The model features cross-income effects, that is, wealth effects at the household level affect
the partners labor market decisions. This is the key assumption to drive the mechanism we
want to capture. Additionally, because we assume l > 0, labor market participation is zero
if own productivity is sufficiently low and household wealth is sufficiently high.
Household wealth is an important determinant of labor market decisions of the secondary
earner, and it depends positively on partner’s labor income. Therefore, a rise in the partner’s
labor income can cause market hours to drop and eventually participation to go to zero.
The assumption of comparative advantage of wives in home production or gender wage
gaps is important to reinforce this effects, because it causes wives’ participation and market
hours to be lower than husbands’, and home hours to be higher - everything else equal.
Even if γf = γm, if wives’ home hours are greater than husbands’, they have higher Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
Lastly, from a dynamic point of view, the existence of returns to experience and human
capital depreciation help generate diverging earnings paths for the secondary earner. There’s
a high return for staying in the labor force, but for those who exit, there is an important
share of earnings forgone at the time of re-entering, so some may be discouraged to re-enter
and instead decide to remain out of the labor force.
2.3.3 One Period Model
To clarify the mechanisms at work in this economy we examine a one period model without


















The first order necessary conditions for this problem are:
θsc−σ − λsφ (ls)1/γ
s
≤ 0,
with equality for ls > l, for s = f,m.
With these conditions, we can derive a number of useful properties of the labor supply













This expression implies that for a spouse who contributes less than one to one to household
income, labor supply increases in the wage even if σ > 1, whereas in a model with individual
labor supply, wealth effects would dominate for this parameterization.









for s− 6= s. This implies that higher values of σ and of γ tend to exacerbate the negative
wealth effects stemming from a spouse’s increase in earnings, the more so the larger the
contribution of the spouse to household income.
Comparative Statics Results
We now examine the response to variations in productivity. We conduct two experiments:
we first just increase the productivity of both men and women by the same percentage, and
then increase women’s productivity by a smaller percentage than men.
Our benchmark parameter values set σ = 1.2. For this value, there are strong wealth
effects of a rise in productivity, so that both female and male labor supply declines. In the
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case in which female productivity rises by less then males, female hours decline by more than
they do when female and male productivity increase at the same rate, while husband’s home
hours rise with productivity. This suggests a cross-income effect of husband’s income on
wives’ labor supply and a small difference in productivity growth across genders is necessary
to obtain results that at least qualitatively can match the data.
We consider the sensitivity of these properties of the model to various parameters.
Human capital depreciation rate, δ: higher values of this parameter increase labor supply
for both wives and husbands in both periods, suggesting a negative wealth effect. They also
seem to steepen the decline in labor supply by age, but they do not affect the basic pattern
describe above.
Elasticity of hours of effort, γ: higher values of this parameter increase labor supply but
do not affect the benchmark pattern of response to productivities, both with and without
home hours. Home hours are very sensitive to the division of labor, and this sensitivity
increases for higher values of γ. For high enough values of γ, women work more than men,
provided the gender difference in productivity is not too large. This finding may be due to
the fact that the elasticity of labor supply is effectively higher for women, given that they
have higher home hours.
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption, σ: lower values of this parameter
imply that in the case in which productivity rises equally for both spouses, labor supply also
rises, those the rise seems to be smaller (in percentage terms) for wives than for husbands.
Still, when productivity rises less for women, their labor supply declines as their productivity
rises, while it rises more strongly for husbands. The behavior is similar with and without
home hours.
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2.4 Calibration and Numerical Analysis
2.4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match 1993 aggregate statistics on aggregate participation, skill
premia, gender wage gap by education, within household female/male market hours ratio.
Then, we increase θm and θf to match the average skill premium in 1995-2005 for both
genders and we examine the change in participation by gender. We also set θm and θf to
match the projected average skill premium for the same period for both genders, and compare
the model outcomes under the projected skill premium and the actual skill premium, to gauge
the effects on married women’s labor force participation.
This exercise isolates the effects of changes in the skill premium on participation and
provides a measure of the role of wealth effects in explaining the difference in participation
under the two values of the skill premium. In computing the aggregates, we use the average
household type distribution in 1995-2005.
There are three groups of parameters we set, shown in tables 2.4, and 2.5. The first group,
in table 2.4, are the parameters we set in a conservative way. We assume equal bargaining
power within the household, no initial assets, equal initial human capital ex-idiosyncratic
productivity, equal weight of home hours in the home production function, and a standard
discount rate.
Table 2.4: Standard Parameters
Parameter Value
β annual 0.965





ψf , ψm 0.5, 0.5
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Table 2.5 reports the values of parameters that are set based on the data or on inde-
pendent evidence. We take the distribution of household education types from the data.
We estimate the productivity distribution (using earnings residuals) by education groups;
its standard deviations are reported in table 2.5. We take the returns to experience from
Olivetti (2006).
Table 2.5: Parameters Set Based on Data and Independent Evidence
Distribution of household types
hs− hs c− hs hs− c c− c
1993 63% 12% 7% 18%
Productivity distribution, σθi,s
f, hs f, c m, hs m, c
1993 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.70
Labor supply
γf γm l δ, α
0.3 0.3 0.23 0.08, 0.75
Table 2.6 shows the parameters we set to match the moments in 1993, and table 2.7
shows the moments used in the calibration.





















H {0.48, 0.36, 0}
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Table 2.7: Data/Model Moment Comparison
Data Model
Women Men Women Men
Participation 0.58 0.85 0.58 0.85
Skill premium 1.58 1.77 1.58 1.77
Market/home hours 1.02 5.09 0.78 2.59
Male/female wages 1.40 1.40
Male/female wages HS 1.29 1.29
Male/female wages Coll 1.45 1.45
Wife/husband home hours 2.94 1.90
Wife/husband market hours 0.59 0.57
2.4.2 Experiments
Response of labor supply to a rise in the skill premium
In this exercise, we increase the mean productivity level of the college group θc,s to match the
projected and actual 1995-2005 average skill premium by gender. We then compare married
women’s participation for projected and actual skill premium.
To account for the demographic changes in this period, we update the household compo-
sition according to the education types in the data. Table 2.8 shows the household weights
by household composition at different points in time. The complete evolution of households
composition over time is shown in figure 2.14
Table 2.8: Household Weights
HS - HS Coll - HS HS - Coll Coll - Coll
1993 0.63 0.12 0.07 0.18
2005 0.56 0.12 0.10 0.22
The results from this exercise are shown in tables 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. Table 2.9 shows the
results in terms of female labor force participation, in aggregate and by groups. Aggregate
labor supply of women falls by 3.95%. This accounts for 44% of the difference between
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projected and actual labor supply of married women in the data.
With respect to education groups, there is an 8% drop in labor supply of women with
college, which accounts for 66% of the difference between projected and actual in data,
and a 2.6% drop in labor participation of women with high school, which is a 27% of the
difference between actual and projected. Since the distribution of productivity for the high
school workers did not change in this exercise, then there is no effect on wives of high school
husbands. On the other hand, the response of wives of college husbands indicates a drop of
20% in labor force participation, and thus over predicts the drop in the data.
Table 2.9: Response of Female Labor Supply
Married Women’s Participation
Aggregate
Own education Husband’s education
HS Coll HS husb Coll husb
Average 1995-2005 Model
Actual-Projected -0.023 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.08
Actual-Projected% -3.95 -2.6 -8.3 0 -20.0
Average 1995-2005 Data
Actual-Projected -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10
Actual-Projected% -8.9 -9.5 -12.1 -8.9 -14.0
Table 2.10 shows the response of wages by gender. We target the effective change in skill
premium by gender, and this implies that the gender wage gap worsens for college graduates.
The exercise predicts 34% of the projected worsening.
In table 2.11 we look at the response of female labor supply in the four educational types
of households.
From this exercise we see that household wealth effects due to cross-income elasticity
arising from a sudden increase in male skill premium can account for approximately half of
the difference between actual and projected rates of married women’s participation in 1995-
2005 relative to the 1975-1993 trend. This effect accounts for two thirds of the difference
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Table 2.10: Response of Wages by Gender
Skill Premium Male/Female Wages
Male Female High school College
Average 1995-2005 Model
Actual-Projected 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.05
Actual-Projected% 6.29 2.5 0 3.57
Average 1995-2005 Data
Actual-Projected 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.14
Actual-Projected% 6.29 2.5 8.4 10.61
Table 2.11: Response of Female Labor Supply by Household Types
Married Women’s Participation
Household Types (M-F) HS-HS C-HS HS-C C-C
Average 1995-2005 Model
Actual-Projected 0 -0.09 0.002 -0.07
Actual-Projected% 0 -39.5 0.2 -13.9
Average 1995-2005 Data
Actual-Projected -0.65 -0.115 -0.065 -0.126
Actual-Projected% -9.8 -17. 1 -8.1 -16.7
for college women, and for one third of the worsening (with respect to trend) of the male to
female wage gap for skilled workers.
This version of the model over predicts the fall in participation of high school women mar-
ried to a college husband, and it does not predict any deviation from trend in participation
of high school women married to high school husbands.
The limitations of this exercise arise because the calibrated model is unable to fully
match the asymmetric distribution of home production and the distribution of participation
by household type. A possible solution to this is to calibrate the relative weights of home
hours in the home production function instead of imposing equality.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented evidence of changes in trends of labor force participation
of married women in the U.S. Since early to mid 1990s, the labor force participation rate
of married women has stopped increasing and the gender wage gap has stopped improving.
We have shown that these changes in trends are different for different groups of women. In
particular, the deterioration in labor market indicators has been stronger for married women
with college degree and for women married to a very high earning husband.
We connected these phenomena to the growth of the skill premium, which substantially
accelerated in those years and more so for male workers. Our hypothesis is that the growth
in wages for highly educated men generated a negative wealth effect on the labor supply of
their female spouses, reducing their labor supply and their wages relative to men.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we developed a model of household labor supply which can
qualitatively reproduce salient features of the data. When shocked with such an increase
in skill premium, the model produces a negative effect on wives’ participation of a rise in
husbands’ earnings. The calibrated version of the model accounts for more than half the
decline relative to trend in married women’s participation in 1995-2005, and more than two
thirds for college women. The model can also account for one third of the rise in the gender
wage gap for college graduates relative to trend in the same period.
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Chapter 3




Many questions in the macroeconomic literature consider the role of labor market risk and
earnings inequality, and its policy implications depend on the assumptions made about the
underlying process for income. Understanding the determinants of inequality, and the sources
of risk an individual faces in the labor market is of crucial importance for questions related
to welfare changes due to changes in the labor market conditions, to education policies,
retirement policies, and even asset pricing.
Given the observed increase in earnings inequality that was registered in the US in the last
decades, especially during the eighties, there has been an emergence of literature devoted to
decomposing the observed changes in labor income inequality into transitory and persistent
components, and to measuring the consequences of these changes on consumption inequality
and welfare.1 In order to do so, most of this literature has to rely on some statistical method
to represent the life cycle income process for individuals that captures the patterns observed
in the data. One important aspect observed on the data is that within-cohort inequality
increases during the life cycle, as pointed out by Deaton and Paxson (1994).
The literature on the idiosyncratic labor market risk over the life cycle estimates its
results using a sample of male heads of household (Guvenen, 2009; Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante, 2010) or a sample that does not distinguish men from women (Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron, 2004). However, there is reason to believe that the earnings process
for women might be different than that for men, given that the characteristics of the labor
market are different for each gender. This is the case for the well documented gender gap
and its recent evolution, where its narrowing can be seen as one of the causes behind the
1Examples on this literature are Gottschalk et al. (1994); Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) and Blundell and
Preston (1998).
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of labor force participation and gender wage gap.
Figure 3.1 displays the evolution of labor force participation by sex, and the gender
gap for the years of my sample.3 Given the elevated participation of women in the labor
force, studying the characteristics of the income process for this group seems of particular
importance. In order to understand the impact of changes in labor market risk on household
consumption and savings behavior, the dynamics of earnings for both potential earners in
the household should be studied. The difficulty of this analysis is that, on average, the
working career of women who participate in the labor force suffers more interruptions than
that of men, and it has been extensively documented that this has an impact on women’s
earnings. The probability of a worker going from employment to out of the labor force has
been significantly higher for women than for men at all times. As a consequence of this
weaker attachment to the labor force, the expected earnings process that the average female
worker faces over her lifetime is also different than for a male worker. And given that the
differences between genders observed in the labor market (earnings and participation gap)
2See Blau and Kahn (2000, 2006).
3 The tables corresponding to these graphs and summary statistics of the sample are presented in Ap-
pendix B.
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are still persistent, the earnings process for women should be estimated separately than that
for men. The resulting differences in the two processes capture factors like incidence of career
interruptions and gender differences in the labor market.
It is interesting to note that gender differences are persistent across education levels.
Because women can bear children and because they are typically the secondary earner in
the household, the labor market decisions of women and men are still different even for
highly educated workers. For example, Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) document large
and raising gender gap in earnings over careers of graduates from top US business schools
MBAs. They find this is due to differences in training prior to MBA graduation, career
interruptions, weekly hours. These last two causes are connected to motherhood. Albanesi
and Prados (2013) document that large earnings gains for men seen in the late twentieth
century have had a detrimental impact on the participation and earnings of married women
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of inequality in earnings and wages by gender
The different evolution that earnings and wage inequality have suffered for these two
groups over the last quarter of a century raises the need to separately estimate the properties
of the labor income process for men and for women. As can be seen in figure 3.2, earnings
dispersion for men has increased steadily during the eighties and early nineties, while it has
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remained much more stable for women over the same period. Looking at different educational
groups, figure 3.3 shows that the increase in earnings inequality for males was much more
noticeable for college educated workers than for unskilled workers (those with high school
education or less); while for females, inequality is stable for college educated workers, but it
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Figure 3.3: Profiles of variance of log earnings residuals by education groups, long sample.
The representation for income processes that has been most widespread used in the
literature dealing with different aspects of residual wage dispersion, is that where earnings
follow some specification of an ARMA process. A popular specification for this, uses a
multiplicative decomposition into temporary and permanent shocks (for example, Carroll
(1997) , and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)), where the temporary shock is i.i.d. and
the permanent shock is highly persistent, and in some cases exhibits a unit root (Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron, 2001). This type of process assumes earnings profiles have a common
structure along the life cycle, and stochastic deviations from this deterministic path are
4Two issues of particular importance related to the female participation in the labor market are those
related to sample selection, and to fertility decisions. Since the objective of this exercise is to quantify the
heterogeneity among the workers, and to measure its contribution to earnings inequality for participants of
the labor market, I believe this can be done as a first step without the need to embed this considerations in
a decisional model.
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accountable for the risk an individual faces along his working life.
Guvenen (2007, 2009) and Primiceri and Van Rens (2009) revived a long-standing debate
on whether the best statistical representation for the wage process is an ARMA process or
one with deterministic heterogeneity in wage profiles across individuals5. These two views
on the nature of the income process differ in that one allows for heterogeneity in earnings
profiles along the life cycle - the “heterogeneous income profiles” specification in terms of
Guvenen (2009) - while the other does not allow for idiosyncratic rates of income growth on
age - the ARMA or “restricted income profiles” specification. Guvenen (2009) finds evidence
that supports the heterogeneous profiles hypothesis, using data from PSID for male heads
of household, and he also shows that restricting the life cycle profile to be homogeneous
among individuals implies an upward bias in the estimation of the persistence parameter -
the autoregressive coefficient in the AR(1) specification.
The goal of this paper is twofold. In the first place, I document some of the main statistical
differences between earnings processes for females and males over the life cycle. The fact that
women’s decision to participate in the labor force is more strongly related to their fertility
decisions than for men, and that women’s reproductive possibilities are biologically restricted
to a range of ages, may be a fundamental factor contributing to generating a pattern in the
earnings dispersion data for females that is different than that for males. This finding casts
some questions on the appropriateness of pooling these two groups together without taking
into account their differences, as in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), and suggests
that different statistical processes should be used for the two groups. Secondly, I estimate
three parsimonious process that represent the earnings profile of female workers. I do this
by estimating a model in the ARMA tradition, the heterogeneous profiles model proposed
by Guvenen (2009), and an alternative specification of this last one.
5Lillard and Weiss (1979) was the first paper to find support for the hypothesis of heterogeneous income
profiles. Along these lines are also the works by Baker (1997), and Haider (2001).
87
In section 2, I present the statistical model to be estimated for the income process in
the life cycle. Section 3 describes data and methodology used. Section 4 presents the main
empirical findings for the groups of males and females, and section 5 concludes.
3.1.1 The Statistical Model
Following the usual specification in the heterogeneous profiles literature, the general process
for log labor earnings, yih,t of individual i with h years of labor market experience in year t
is given by:
yih,t = g(θt, X
i
h,t) + f(θ





where i = 1, ...I indicates individual; h = 1, ..., H stands for experience in the labor
market, t = 1, ..., T is time, X ih,t is a vector of individual characteristics, and θ
i is a vector
of idiosyncratic parameters.
The stochastic component of income is modeled as an AR(1) process - the persistent
component - plus a transitory shock. Since there have been changes in the sizes of both per-
sistent and transitory income shocks over the sample period under study, non-stationarity
is allowed for by letting the AR(1) component, and the transitory component, have het-





The functions g and f refer to the life cycle component of earnings. The function g
captures the common component of the life cycle, and in principle could depend on unob-
servable characteristics of the individual. A very simple version is used, where g is function




h,t) = θ1,th+ θ2,th
2 + θ3,th
3
The function f denotes the idiosyncratic component of the life cycle. I will consider three
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specifications of this function, as follows. First, a specification for the restricted income
profiles is one where f(.) = αi, where αi is a fixed effect for individual i.
Second, a version of heterogeneous income profiles is considered like the one used by
Haider (2001) and Guvenen (2009), where an idiosyncratic growth rate of earnings is incor-
porated into the f function as follows:
f(αi, βi, X ih,t) = α
i + βih
It should be noted that there is no reason a priori to assume that the idiosyncratic
growth rate of earnings should be constant on experience. In particular, a natural extension
would be to include a quadratic term in the f function. There is no consensus about this
specification in the literature. In an early work on heterogeneity by Baker (1997), he finds
that for his sample of males this quadratic term is imprecisely estimated, and the estimates
are very similar to those in the linear specification. However, Lillard and Reville (1999)
suggest that the quadratic term might be important. Therefore, the third specification is
one that includes this term in the f function, hence:
f i(X ih,t) = α
i + βih+ γih2
This is the referred to as the quadratic version.6
The earnings residual ŷih,t is obtained regressing y
i
h,t on the polynomial g. The variance-
covariance structure of the residual is given by:
var(ŷih,t) = σ
2











6It will later become clearer that this quadratic formulation is a priori of particular interest in the case
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for t > 1, h > 1.
In estimating the restricted version, the following restriction is imposed: σβ = σαβ =
σγ = σαγ = σβγ = 0
In the heterogeneous profiles specification, fewer parameters are restricted: σγ = σαγ =
σβγ = 0, whereas in the quadratic version, no such restriction is imposed. I will try to
estimate and assess if there seems to be support in the data for heterogeneous profiles for





I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) of the University of Michigan.7
The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women,
and children) and the family units in which they reside. It emphasizes the dynamic aspects
of economic and demographic behavior. From 1968 to 1997, the PSID interviewed and re-
interviewed individuals from families in the core sample every year, whether or not they were
living in the same dwelling or with the same people. Adults have been followed as they have
grown older, and children have been observed as they advance through childhood and into
adulthood, forming family units of their own.
I use the waves for years 1970-1997 because after 1997 the PSID changed to biennial
data collection. Since the survey reports information about the previous year’s earnings and
hours worked, the information corresponds to the period 1969-1996.
Following the literature, I use only the cross-sectional sample drawn by the Survey Re-
search Center (SRC) (that is, I do not use the data from the Survey of Economic Opportunity
(SEO), which oversampled low income families), hence I do not need to weight the data.
Sample Construction
The construction of a sample appropriate for this kind of exercise faces a trade off between
the decision to work with a balanced panel or not, and the amount of individuals and
observations in the sample. Different approaches have been implemented in the related
7I use a standardized version of this data base prepared at the Department of Policy Analysis and Man-
agement at Cornell University, the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF). http://www.human.cornell.
edu/pam/research/centers-programs/german-panel/cnef.cfm
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literature about this issue. Baker (1997) worked with a balanced panel, but later work has
relied on unbalanced panels. In this fashion, Haider (2001) includes an individual in the
sample if he complies with the requisites for at least two years, and Guvenen (2009) includes
an individual in the sample if he meets the requirements for at least twenty - not necessarily
continuous - years out of a maximum of twenty six years in the data set.
For the main samples of men and women (long samples), I follow a criteria closer to that
in Guvenen (2009), and include an individual in the sample if she meets the requirements for
at least nineteen - not necessarily continuous - years out of the twenty eight years in the data
set. This choice reflects a trade-off between including women who have a strong attachment
to the labor force and maintaining a sensible sample size. In the secondary samples (short
samples), I include individuals who meet the requirements for only ten years.
Ideally, the estimation of the earnings process for women would be done using data on
women who are head of household. Unfortunately, the sample size would be drastically
reduced by this requirement. Therefore, to maintain a sensible sample size, I select a sample
of women without imposing this head of household requirement. The sample includes women
of all marital statuses. In order to deal with selection into labor force participation, I use a
two-step Heckman selection model to obtain the earnings residuals.
The requirements for the samples of women are: between 20 and 64 years old (inclusive),
not in the SEO, with positive earnings and hours worked, who worked between 520 and 5200
hours per year and earned more than $1.5/hour and less than $500/hour. This criteria leaves
636 individuals in the sample of women, and 14,697 individual-year observations, and 563
individuals and 9,776 individual-year observations in the sub-sample of married women.8
The requirements for the sample of men are: head of household, between 20 and 64
years old (inclusive), not in the SEO, with positive earnings and hours worked, who worked
8I use the sample of women between 20 and 64 years old, not in SEO, to estimate the log earnings
residuals, and then I select a subsample of women based on hourly wages and annual hours worked.
92
between 520 hours and 5200 hours per year, and earned more than $1.5/hour and less than
$500/hour. This criteria leaves 1,135 individuals in the sample, and 25,190 individual-year
observations.
Real hourly wage was computed as annual earnings divided by annual hours worked,
deflated by CPI with 1993 as the base year.
Experience of individual i at time t (hit) is computed as potential experience in the labor
market, according to the following formula:9 hit = age
i
t − 6−max{educationit, 12}
3.2.2 Estimation by Minimum Distance
I estimate the parameters of interest following the minimum distance estimation strategy.10
The estimator b̂ is such that it minimizes the distance between the elements of the sam-
ple covariance matrix C obtained from the earnings residuals, and those of the theoretical
counterpart.
Let F i(b,Xi, χi) be a vector for each individual, where the element m is:






χin indicates if the individual i contributes to the distinct moment condition n. There are
N = T (T+1)/2 such conditions, that relate sample and theoretical covariances corresponding
to periods t and t+m. (t = 1, ..., T )




h+m,t+m) across individuals of all
9In Appendix B, I discuss the use of an alternative measure for experience, which is a proxy for actual
experience in the labor market.
10First proposed by Chamberlain (1984), and that is of widespread use in the literature related to income
processes. The estimators thus obtained are consistent and asymptotically Normal.
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where In is the sum over all χ
i
n.
Therefore, the estimator can be defined as:
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I follow the recommendation of Altonji and Segal (1996) to use the identity matrix as
weighting matrix with small samples. However, each moment in the vector F is calculated
using a different number of observations, thus the fact that the panel is unbalanced is taken
into account by using AN , which is a diagonal matrix with element I/In at the n
th diagonal
element (I being the total amount of individuals in the sample).
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Earnings profiles for males and females
Table 3.1 shows the mean of age, years of education, annual earnings, hourly wage, annual
hours of work, and potential labor market experience for men and women in the long sample.
Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B present the main descriptive statistics for the group of
males and that of females for all the years in the short sample.
These tables show sharp differences between the male and female samples. The mean
age is similar for both subsamples over the sample period. Education level, however, is on
average higher for the male sample on every year. Mean hours worked and average hourly
wage is considerably lower for the female sample, as well as cross sectional earnings and
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Table 3.1: Means for Males and Females
Sample Men Sample Married Women Sample All Women
Variables
Age 41.37 42.66 41.13
Number of Years of Education 13.39 13.09 13.21
Annual Earnings 45,662 23,027 23,967
Hourly Wage 20.43 13.34 13.31
Annual Work Hours of Individual 2,271 1,737 1,816
Potential Experience 22.63 24.28 22.68
Observations 23,453 6,606 13977
Source: PSID, long sample constructed according to section 3.2
wage dispersion. These differences in labor market outcome may be attributable to the
lower education level of the female subsample - although this difference is narrowing rapidly
over recent years - to the gender gap, to the differential impact of fertility on the two genders,
and to differences in full time or part time participation.11
Some characteristics of the earnings process can be noted by looking at the profile of






















In this expression, inequality is decomposed in a first component that does not depend
on experience, a second component which captures the effect of heterogeneous profiles on
inequality along the life cycle, with a decreasing linear term, and an increasing quadratic
term on experience; and finally a last component that denotes the inequality derived from
11Given the sample size of the data set used in this work, it is not possible to discriminate between part
time and full time workers. However, since the nature of this exercise is to assess the characteristics of the
earnings profile over the life cycle, and many different events can be categorized under the stochastic shocks,
then it is not clear that this distinction should be made.
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the accumulated effects of the persistent shocks.
The variance of earnings, thus, as a function of experience, displays a convex component
due to heterogeneous profiles, and a concave component due to the accumulated effects of the
persistent shock. If the persistent component dominates, we should expect to see in the data
a concave earnings profile. It is useful to see the empirical counterpart of this theoretical
variance to verify if the data supports convex or concave profiles for each group. That is,
in presence of heterogeneous profiles, as the individual gets older, the convex component
should dominate over the concave component.
Both panels of figure 3.4 show the cross sectional variance of earnings as a function of
experience for the short sample. Figure 3.4(a) shows earnings dispersion for males, the first
graph corresponds to the whole male sample, the second to the college sample, and the third
to the high school group.12 The analogous set of graphs for married women is presented in
figure 3.4(b).
These raw variances were constructed by constructing cells for different experience groups.
The cells have a range of two, meaning that a cell denoted by experience level h̃ includes
individuals who have experience level h such that h̃ − 2 ≤ h ≤ h̃ + 2.13 Since the sample
includes individuals from 20 to 64 years old, there will be 41 experience bins. The solid
lines in Figure 3.4 represent the raw variance computed as the cross sectional variance of the
earnings residual over each bin.
Two aspects must to be considered when constructing the empirical age profile of earn-
ings: it is necessary to account for the time variation in the variances of the shocks, and also
for the between-cohorts effects, since the data used to compute the variances corresponds to
several cohorts. As experience is linear on age, and age, cohort and year are each a linear
12This last group consists of those individuals who obtained no more than a high school diploma, i.e., it
also includes high school dropouts and lower.
13This procedure follows Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005) and Guvenen (2009).
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Figure 3.4: Within-groups variance of earnings residuals
combination of the other two, cohort effects and time effects are difficult to identify. There-
fore, I will control for cohort and time effects in turns to see their effects on the inequality
profile.14 To remove the time effects, these raw variances are regressed against a full set
of experience and year dummies, and the coefficients on experience dummies are plotted
in Figure 3.4 with dashed lines. To remove the cohort effects, variances are computed in
cohort-experience cells, and regressed against a full set of experience and cohort dummies.
The coefficient on the experience dummies are plotted using lines with diamonds.
Figure 3.4(a) shows that for males, especially for college educated men, the profile is
notably convex, giving support to the assumption that heterogeneous profiles can be an
important component of inequality. For unskilled men, those with high school education
14Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005) point out that “the dynamics of cross sectional inequality
across time and age groups are consistent with the presence of time effects and absence of cohort effects, but
inconsistent with the presence of cohort effects and absence of time effects.”
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or less, the profile is much flatter, for all experience levels. When time effects are removed,
inequality seems to go down, in particular for the latter stages of the life cycle. Cohort effects
have opposite effects for the college and the high school male subsamples. Removing cohort
effects increases dispersion latter in life for college graduates, but decreases it for unskilled
workers.
Figure 3.4(b) shows that the profile of earnings variances for women has a less convex
shape. It is flatter overall, with a sharp increase of inequality early in the life cycle, and a
latter flattening, which gives rise to a double humped shaped profile, instead of the more
expectable humped shaped one.15 This characteristic of the whole female sample remains
similar in the two subsamples by education levels.
It is worth noting when comparing males and females profiles, that - first steep portion
for women aside - inequality seems to not increase by too much for unskilled workers of any
sex, but for college educated workers, the increase in inequality is higher for men than for
women - for men exceeds 0.7 whereas for women it never reaches 0.6. Also, inequality goes
down earlier for college educated women than for college educated men.
For women, removing time effects has a similar consequence than for men (decrease
inequality for college, and increases for high school subsamples). From observing these
figures it becomes evident that the same process can not be used to fit both the male and
the female profile of earnings dispersion. However, the differences between college and high
school samples are much more noticeable for the females group.
When removing cohort effects, inequality among college graduates slightly increases in
later stages of the life cycle, whereas when removing time effects inequality in that period
is lower. The overall pattern of inequality over the life cycle, though, remains very similar
to the one of the raw variances, with a noticeable increase in inequality early in the working
15In Appendix B, I present an alternative attempt to deal with this characteristic.
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life and a persistent lower level of inequality between experience levels 18 and 25. The peak
of this hump corresponds to a labor market experience of 15 years, which for the college
graduates happens between 37 and 40 years old women. Inequality goes down after this age
until mid forties, and then up again.
This result does not longer hold for the high school sample. For this group, when cohort
effects are removed, inequality is higher at 11 years of labor market experience, then declines
and it does not seem to change much among those with more than 25 years of potential labor
market experience (on average, for women older than 43 years old). However, when time
effects are removed for the high school sample, inequality goes up sharply between entrance
to the labor force and the eleventh year, and then remains almost at the same level, with a
small increase as the labor market experience increases. But there no longer seems to be a
hump for inequality over the early working life.
This peculiar shape of the earnings profile for females - especially for the college subsample
- is what justifies the estimation of the quadratic specification, in the hope that it will capture
any change in growth rates over the life cycle.
Figure 3.5 plots the variances of earnings residuals for four representative cohorts by
experience. It can be noted there that the life cycle profile seems to have become less
unequal for younger cohorts of women. For all groups and cohorts, the inequality profile
seems to be steep at the beginning and have a hump later on.
As for time effects, Figure 3.6 presents the evolution of within-cohort inequality through
time. There seems to have been a decline in inequality for older cohorts, but not so much
for younger cohorts.
A potential interpretation of the steepness of the inequality profile for women may take
into account that this increase occurs mostly between experience levels one and fourteen,
which would roughly correspond to women between ages twenty one and thirty five years
old, which is the most common range of ages where women decide to have children. Fertility
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Figure 3.5: Variance of earnings residuals by cohorts




































Figure 3.6: Within-cohort inequality through time
creates an additional source of inequality for women because of different labor market deci-
sions made at the time of bearing children give rise to different future earnings paths. Some
women do not affect their labor market decisions in face of a newborn child, while others
decide to work less hours, or to work in less demanding jobs. This creates a wedge between
the earnings path of those women, even after they go back to the labor market, and those
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of women who have not had children.
To give an idea of the possible correlation between these two phenomena, figure 3.7
presents the frequency of “new children” in the household for women of different experience
levels. Most of these changes take place for women of experience levels from four to fourteen.
For reference, 56% of married women in the sample have children in the household, while
34% of not married women have children living in the household (not married women in the
sample include never married as well as divorced/separated/widow).

















Figure 3.7: “New children” in the household, married women sample.
3.3.2 Estimation Results
I estimated three specifications of the income process for different groups in the short sample
(restricted, heterogeneous profiles, and quadratic). I estimated two specifications (restricted
and heterogeneous profiles) for the long sample in subsection 3.3.4.
Table 3.2 corresponds to the male short sample, and table 3.3 to the married females short
sample. The first panel in tables 3.2 and 3.3 corresponds to the restricted specification, the
second panel to the heterogeneous profiles specification, and the third panel to the quadratic
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formulation. The first row of each panel corresponds to both education groups together -
the whole sample, the second row to the college educated subsample, and the third row to
the subsample with high school education or less.
Table 3.2: Estimates for men
Table 1: Estimates for males
 2  
2







(1) Men - all 0.9200 0.1476 1.5312 1.1538
(2) Men - high school 0.8416 0.1182 4.4345 0.7030
(3) Men - college 0.9489 0.0878 13.694 5.8714
(4) Men - all 0.8960 0.1075 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0198 0.0573
(5) Men - high school 0.7855 0.1839 -0.0034 0.0002 0.1042 0.0475
(6) Men - college 0.7781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0360 0.0736
(7) Men - all 0.5462 0.0000 -0.2660 0.0000 0.2243 -0.0217 0.0009 0.2521 0.0429
(8) Men - high school 0.9922 0.2253 -0.1861 0.0004 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.6479 0.0344
(9) Men - college 0.9894 0.2232 0.0477 0.0002 0.0294 -0.0035 0.0002 2.9932 0.0000
Table 2: Estimates for females
 2  
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(1) Women - all 0.9015 0.1410 1.749 1.122
(2) Women - high school 0.8845 0.1231 10.38 1.804
(3) Women - college 0.9326 0.0772 1.307 1.503
(4) Women - all 0.8275 0.1647 0.0006 0.0000 0.0360 0.0736
(5) Women - high school 0.8248 0.2181 -0.0027 0.0001 0.0303 0.0646
(6) Women - college 0.8491 0.1449 -0.0021 0.0002 0.0413 0.0615
(7) Women - all 0.4676 0.4063 0.0044 0.0000 0.0034 -0.0004 0.00002 1.0083 0.079
(8) Women - high school 0.2768 0.1146 -0.3538 0.0002 0.0151 -0.0001 0.00000 1.2483 0.088
(9) Women - college 0.8503 0.0000 0.1158 0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0005 0.00002 1.2426 0.005
When comparing the results of the estimated RIP process for males and females (in the Örst
panel of each table), the estimated persistence is higher for the high school group of females
than that for the one of males, whereas persistence is higher for college men than for college
women. This pattern changes when the HIP speciÖcation is estimated. As can be seen from
the second panel in each table, persistence is still in this case lower for high school men than
for high school women, but now it is also lower for college men than for college women. It
is worth noting that the coe¢cient of the persistent component is much higher for the any
of the two group of females than for any of the two groups of males. In turn, for females
the college group has higher persistence than the high school group, in contrary to the case
for males. For both genders, the estimate of persistence  is higher under RIP than under
HIP, which is consistent with the Öndings in Guvenen (2007,b). It is also the case that 2 is
higher for the college subsample than for the high school sample for both genders.
The third panel provides estimates of the quadratic version of the model. The results from
this estimation appear somewhat odd, and would require further analysis. In particular,
persistence is higher for males than in the HIP speciÖcation, but it is much lower for the
female high school group than what it is under HIP speciÖcation. For all groups except college
males the variance of the growth rate of earnings goes up under the quadratic speciÖcation
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than that for the one of males, whereas persistence is higher for college men than for college
women. This pattern changes when the HIP speciÖcation is estimated. As can be seen from
the second panel in each table, persistence is still in this case lower for high school men than
for high school women, but now it is also lower for college men than for college women. It
is worth noting that the coe¢cient of the persistent component is much higher for the any
of the two group of females than for any of the two groups of males. In turn, for females
the college group has higher persistence than the high school group, in contrary to the case
for males. For both genders, the estimate of persistence  is higher under RIP than under
HIP, which is consistent with the Öndings in Guvenen (2007,b). It is also the case that 2 is
higher for the college subsample than for the high school sample for both genders.
The third panel provides estimates of the quadratic version of the model. The results from
this estimation appear somewhat odd, and would require further analysis. In particular,
persistence is higher for males than in the HIP speciÖcation, but it is much lower for the
female high school group than what it is under HIP speciÖcation. For all groups except college
males the variance of the growth rate of earnings goes up under the quadratic speciÖcation
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When comparing the results of the estimated restricted process for males and married
females (in the first pan l of each table), th estimated persistence is higher for the high
school grou of females han that for the one of males, whereas persistence is higher for
college men than for college women. This pattern changes when the heterogeneous profiles
specification is estimated. As can be seen from the second panel in each table, persistence
is still in this case lower for high sch ol men than for high school women, but now i is lso
lower for college men than for college women.
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It is worth noting that the coefficient of the persistent component is much higher for the
any of the two group of females than for any of the two groups of males. In turn, for females
the college group has higher persistence than the high school group, in contrary to the case
for males. For both genders, the estimate of persistence ρ is higher under the AR(1) than
under the heterogeneous profiles model, which is consistent with the findings in Guvenen
(2009). It is also the case that σ2β is higher for the college subsample than for the high school
sample for both genders.
The third panel provides estimates of the quadratic version of the model. When com-
pared to the heterogeneous profiles specification, in this specification, persistence is higher
for males, but it is much lower for the female high school group. For all groups except
college males the variance of the growth rate of earnings goes up under the quadratic speci-
fication relative to the heterogeneous profiles estimation. This seems counter-intuitive since
an additional source of heterogeneity is added in the quadratic model.
Figure 3.8 shows the theoretical variance over the life cycle corresponding to the coeffi-
cients estimated for the heterogeneous profiles process. A first glance to the patterns there
presented provides some evidence that this specification does a good job in matching some
of the salient features of the data as observed in section 3.3.1. Overall inequality is more
stable over the life cycle for females than for males in all groups (the profile for females is
flatter), the initial sharp jump in inequality is captured for the female groups, and a steeper
earnings profile is displayed for the college subsample than for the high school groups for
both genders.
Relative importance of persistence and heterogeneity
We can use these estimates to quantify the contribution of heterogeneous profiles to earnings
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Figure 3.9 presents the contribution of each of these components to inequality in the
case where shocks are assumed to be homoskedastic for simplicity. According to the esti-
mated values for the heterogeneous profiles model, the relative importance of the persistent
component and that of heterogeneous profiles changes much more for the male sample than
for females. In the case of men, the heterogeneous component increases sharply its relative
importance after a decade of labor market experience, and helps explain most inequality
among mature individuals. For women, on the contrary, the heterogeneity component does
not rise so much over the life cycle as percentage of inequality, and the persistent component
remains the main source of inequality among women of all ages.
The relative importance of the transitory shock appears to be different for males and
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Figure 3.9: Variance components from heterogeneous profiles estimation, men and married women
3.3.3 Profile of Autocovariances
One other aspect of the identification between heterogeneous profiles and persistent compo-
nent is the evolution of the autocovariances for a given cohort along its life cycle.










The first component of this formula is the heterogeneity component, and the second is
the persistent component. While the heterogeneity component is linear in the number of lags
n for a given cohort, the persistent component fades away as n grows. Figure 3.10 presents
the autocovariance profile for different cohorts for the female high school subsample (left
panel), and the female college subsample (right panel). The autocovariances presented here
were obtained in the following way: after computing autocovariances in the sample using
experience-cohort cells, I regress them against a set of cohort dummies, and average the
105
residuals across cohorts, thus these autocovariances are cleaned of cohort effects.


































































Figure 3.10: Autocovariance profiles, women short sample.
For the high school subsample, the autocorrelation for different ages seems to be decreas-
ing in the lags. There is a peak at 15 lags for all the cohorts that is probably an anomaly
in the sample, instead of evidence of curvature. For higher levels of experience it seems to
be a flattening of the profile. Guvenen (2009) reports a similar pattern for the group of men
with high school education.
For the case of women with college education, the autocovariance profile is slightly U-
shaped at younger ages. For small values of experience, it decreases steeply for short lags,
and then curves up for longer lags. For higher values of experience this curvature is not
observed.
The profiles become very noisy at higher levels of experience due to sample attrition.
But in any case, there does not seem to be strong evidence for the heterogeneity component
being dominant at any point. What seems to dominate is the downward slope derived from
the weakening of the persistent component for higher experience levels.
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3.3.4 The effects of a stronger labor force attachment
The effect of using longer samples is most noticeable for women than for men, as is to be
expected. When only individuals with stronger attachment to the labor force are included
in the sample (long sample), the profile of the earnings process for women changes. Figure
3.11 shows the raw variance of earnings residuals for the long samples of women, for all
women and for married women.16 The profiles are flatter than for the short sample, and
the difference between married women and all women is that for married women there is a
sharper increase in inequality during the low experience years. After 12 years of experience,
both profiles look very similar.
Figure 3.11 also shows the variance profile of earnings for all women when the residuals are
obtained without using the Heckman selection model in a first step. There is no noticeable
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Figure 3.11: Raw variance of earnings residuals for female long samples
16For the long sample of men, the earnings process remains very similar to the short sample, shown in
3.4(a), therefore I omit it from this section.
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Table reports the estimates for restricted and heterogeneous profiles specifications for
the long samples of women, and married women. The estimates of ρ in the restricted
AR(1) specification are close to those from the short sample. However, the estimates for
the heterogeneous profiles specification are quite different than in the short sample. The
shape of the variance profile in figure 3.11 may indicate that the heterogenenous profiles is
not a very good specification for this sample of workers. Because the variance profile is flat,
the best fit will come from a restricted AR(1) specification.
Table 3.4: Estimates, women, long sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All women All women Married Married
VARIABLES Restricted Heterogeneous Restricted Heterogeneous
σ2α 0.0717*** 0.207** 0.0217 0.309***
-0.0214 -0.0869 -0.0151 (0.0958)
ρ 0.795*** 0.671*** 0.850*** 0.134***
-0.022 -0.0243 -0.0269 (0.0259)
σ2ν 0.309*** 0.254*** 0.361*** 0.247***
-0.0392 -0.0464 -0.0492 (0.0523)
σ2ε 0.292*** 0.508 0.188** 0.0555





Time coefficients estimates removed
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4 compares the estimates of all women to those for married women. The persistent
component is strongest for married women than for the group of women in general. Table
3.5 reports the estimates by education groups.The pattern of differences between education
groups still holds in the long sample, and in the general sample of women, since the persistent
component is stronger for the college group than for the high school group.
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Table 3.5: Estimates by education group, women, long sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school High school College College
VARIABLES Restricted Heterogeneous Restricted Heterogeneous
σ2α 0.0319** 0.264*** -0.0596 0.0682
(0.0154) (0.0670) (0.0500) (0.0432)
ρ 0.830*** 0.130*** 0.913*** -0.0412**
(0.0211) (0.0225) (0.00847) (0.0177)
σ2ν 0.328*** 0.234*** 0.260*** 0.185***
(0.0377) (0.0385) (0.0621) (0.0362)
σ2ε 0.285*** 0.0982 0.117* 0.0114





Time coefficients estimates removed
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4 Final remarks
Female workers display lower attachment to the labor force than their male counterparts.
Women’s fertility decisions and the fact that most of married women are secondary earners
in the household, means that women’s careers are more often interrupted than those of men.
This implies that the expected earnings path that a female worker faces over her life cycle is
different than that of men. In this paper I study the characteristics of the earnings process
for groups of women under different requirements in terms of attachment to the labor force.
The life cycle earnings profile of female workers displays the following characteristics:
Inequality increases sharply early in the life cycle of women for all educational groups. For
the less educated group of females, the sharp increase in inequality among younger individuals
seems to account for most of the inequality that will be observed over the whole life cycle. For
female college graduates, however, the increase in inequality among the younger individuals
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is so big that inequality decreases among individuals of more than fifteen years of labor
market experience. This notorious difference in the evolution of inequality among younger
individuals for females compared to males can be thought to be reflecting the differential
impact that fertility choices have on the labor market outcome of men and women. Given the
evidence of lower inequality in younger cohorts at least for college educated women, and of at
least not higher inequality over time for these younger cohorts, then neither cohorts or time
effects can be accountable for the observed steep profile of the early life cycle inequality.
Since fertility may play an important role in generating these patterns, and childbearing
typically occurs at older ages for college women than for women with less education, this
may account for some of the difference in dynamics between the two groups at early stages
of the working life. This interesting aspect would justify further study in the future.
I have presented evidence that the income process for women has different characteristics
than that for men. This is the case for the whole sample, and for educational groups as well.
In particular, inequality is overall lower among women, and decreases earlier in life than for
men. The persistent component - due to the AR(1) part of the process - seems to have more
relative importance in explaining inequality in the case of women than in the case of men. For
men, heterogeneity in earnings profiles becomes the main determinant of inequality among
older individuals, whereas for women this does not occur, and the persistent component
continues to explain almost fifty percent of inequality at ages above retirement age. The
heterogeneity level in growth rates of earnings is lower among females, than among males,
and this difference persists for groups of all education levels. Therefore, there seems to be a
compression in earnings for females relative to men, maybe attributable to the persistence of
the gender gap, hence stochastic shocks tend to have a bigger impact on earnings inequality
among females.
Given the characteristics of the earnings process that women face, and the differences with
that of men, an interesting path of future work is to study how these processes interact in the
110




Acemoglu, Daron, Amy Finkelstein, and Matthew J Notowidigdo. 2013, forthcoming. “In-
come and health spending: Evidence from oil price shocks.” Review of Economics and
Statistics (0).
Adams, P., M.D. Hurd, D.L. McFadden, A. Merrill, and T. Ribeiro. 2004. “Healthy, wealthy,
and wise? Tests for direct causal paths between health and socioeconomic status.” In
Perspectives on the Economics of Aging. University of Chicago Press, 415–526.
Akin, John S., David K. Guilkey, Paul L. Hutchinson, and Michael T. McIntosh. ???? “Price
elasticities of demand for curative health care with control for sample selectivity on en-
dogenous illness: an analysis for Sri Lanka.” Health Economics 7 (6).
Albanesi, S. and M.J. Prados. 2013. “Inequality and household labor supply.” Working
paper.
Altonji, Joseph G and Lewis M Segal. 1996. “Small-sample bias in GMM estimation of
covariance structures.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 14 (3):353–366.
Attanasio, O., S. Kitao, and G.L. Violante. 2010. “Financing Medicare: A general equilib-
rium analysis.” In Demography and the Economy. University of Chicago Press, 333–366.
Baker, Michael. 1997. “Growth-rate heterogeneity and the covariance structure of life-cycle
earnings.” Journal of Labor Economics :338–375.
Bertrand, M., E. Kamenica, and J. Pan. 2013. “Gender Identity and Relative Income within
Households.” NBER Working Paper No.19023 .
Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F Katz. 2010. “Dynamics of the gender
gap for young professionals in the financial and corporate sectors.” American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics :228–255.
Black, Sandra E. and Chinhui Juhn. 2000. “The Rise of Female Professionals: Are Women
Responding to Skill Demand?” The American Economic Review 90 (2):450–455.
Blau, F.D. and L.M. Kahn. 2000. “Gender differences in pay.” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14 (4):75–99.
112
———. 2013. “Female Labor Supply: Why is the US Falling Behind?” NBER Working
Paper No. 18702 .
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2006. “The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s:
Slowing Convergence.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60 (1):pp. 45–66.
Blundell, Richard and Ian Preston. 1998. “Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2):pp. 603–640.
Capatina, E. 2011. “Life-cycle Effects of Health Risk.” working paper.
Carroll, Christopher D. 1997. “Buffer-stock saving and the life cycle/permanent income
hypothesis.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1):1–55.
Cawley, J. and C.J. Ruhm. 2011. “The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors.” Handbook of
Health Economics 2:95.
Chamberlain, Gary. 1984. “Panel data.” Handbook of Econometrics 2:1247–1318.
Chiappori, P.A. 1992. “Collective labor supply and welfare.” Journal of Political Economy
100 (3):437–467.
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Appendix A
Health and Earnings Inequality Over
the Life Cycle
A.1 Data
The MEPS consists of a series of national surveys, structured as panels where a representative
sample of households is interviewed five times over the course of two years. This survey
has been conducted since 1996 by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality.
The MEPS includes standard demographic and economic variables and a comprehensive
set of health-related variables: measures of health status (physical component summary
from Short-Form 12 Version 2, and self-reported health status), health insurance status each
month of the year, health insurance (broad) type, employer offered health insurance or not,
several categories of medical expenditures, and detailed medical conditions.
The sample comprises all non-institutionalized adults ages 25 and above. To calibrate
the steady state of the model, I use the waves corresponding to the years 2007 and 2008.
2009 is an atypical year because of the great recession, with big fluctuations in earnings
and employment that would contaminate the estimates without explicitly taking them into
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account. The data for the 2010 survey was not yet available at the time of the computation
of data moments.
A.1.1 Physical Component Summary
PCS is computed in MEPS using the data from the Short-Form 12 Version 2 (SF12) of the
2007 Self-Administered Questionnaire. The SF12 and the 36 questions version (SF36) were
constructed to survey health status in the Medical Outcomes Survey. These questionnaires
were designed for use in clinical practice and research, health policy evaluations, and gen-
eral population surveys. The SF36 includes one multi-item scale that assesses eight health
concepts: limitations in physical activities because of health problems, limitations in social
activities because of physical or emotional problems, limitations in usual role activities be-
cause of physical health problems, bodily pain, general mental health, limitations in usual
role activities because of emotional problems, vitality (energy and fatigue), and general
health perceptions. The designers of PCS built the measure applying principal component
analysis to obtain weights for questions in each of these categories.
For the history and development of SF36 see Ware Jr and Sherbourne (1992), for de-
tails about construction and validity tests of PCS: McHorney, Ware Jr, and Raczek (1993);
Ware Jr et al. (1995). Ware et al. (1995); Ware, Kosinski, and Keller (1996) and McDowell
(2006) describe SF12 and evaluate the validity of PCS using SF12.
A.1.2 Expenditures and insurance related variables
Table 2 shows the means by age groups for yearly labor earnings (wagep), total medical
and prescriptions expenditures (by individual and insurance) as a fraction of earnings (tot-
exp wagep), fraction of people who are insured during at least 9 months per year (pri ins),
and the health status measured by PCS (pcs norm).
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Table A.1: Variable means by age groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups wagep07x totexp wagep pri ins 07 pcs norm
1 33,982.24 0.17 0.62 0.85
(30,541.27 - 37,423.20) (0.13 - 0.21) (0.57 - 0.68) (0.84 - 0.87)
2 43,741.12 0.13 0.72 0.83
(38,955.96 - 48,526.29) (0.07 - 0.18) (0.68 - 0.77) (0.82 - 0.84)
3 44,408.37 0.19 0.77 0.80
(43,207.03 - 45,609.71) (0.11 - 0.27) (0.76 - 0.77) (0.79 - 0.81)
4 43,236.90 0.43 0.79 0.77
(38,492.71 - 47,981.10) (-0.13 - 1.00) (0.78 - 0.81) (0.76 - 0.79)
5 31,682.76 0.77 0.09 0.74
(30,090.95 - 33,274.56) (0.22 - 1.31) (-0.06 - 0.23) (0.70 - 0.78)
6 22,739.25 1.87 0.02 0.67
(19,663.07 - 25,815.42) (-0.95 - 4.69) (-0.02 - 0.06) (0.60 - 0.74)
Observations 12,433 12,433 12,433 12,433
ci in parentheses
1: 25 34years, 2: 35 44years, 3: 45 54years, 4: 55 64years. Source: MEPS
A.1.3 Employer sponsored health insurance
Figure A.1 shows the fraction of insured individuals by source of private insurance (employer
or union sponsored (ESHI) vs individual insurance) and deciles of earnings. The columns
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Source: MEPS, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Dept. of Human and Health Ss.
Fraction of insured with group vs indiv. ins.
Employer/union group ins. Individual ins.
Figure A.1: Insurance through employer vs individual market
A.2 Disability Weights
The World Health Organization computes measures of the burden of disease in order to set
its program goals and evaluate health policies. Their measure consists in disability-adjusted
life-years (DALY), which includes mortality measures (years of life lost to illness, or YLL)
and morbidity measures (years lived with disabilities, or YLD). The morbidity measure
YLD of each medical condition depends on the incidence of the disease and how disabling
the diseases is, which is measured through disability weights. I follow the same principle to
measure how disabling each condition is, by using the disability weights computed by the
WHO and other health researchers. Table 4 includes WHO’s disability weights by condition
(the adjusted version by Melse et al. (2000); Stouthard, Bonsel et al. (2000), annualized to
account for the average duration of acute conditions). 1
1http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/12/10-084301/en/
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Table A.2: Disability weights by condition




The main structure of the algorithm is as follows - more details below: for a given set of
prices and parameters, I solve the individual problem, I aggregate it and compute equilibrium
values. Adjust prices to reflect the equilibrium values and compute the individual problem
again, and repeat until prices used as input generate the same equilibrium values. Then, I
compute model moments and compare to the data moments. Adjust parameter values to
decrease the distance between them, and solve individual problem and equilibrium again.
Iterate until moments from the model match the chosen moments from the data.
The individual life cycle model is solved using grids for each endogenous state (assets and
health), and discretizing the exogenous states (shocks to productivity and shocks to health).
The persistent productivity shock is discretized using the algorithm by Tauchen (1991). The
shock to health is discretized from the empirical distribution in the data. Given that it is a
finite life model, the optimal solution is found by backwards induction of the value function,
which will depend on age. By discretizing the exogenous states, I have a discrete set of
shock realizations in the algorithm. I thus compute the set of optimal policies for each of
the possible history of stochastic shocks.
I aggregate the economy for a given set of parameter values and compute the equilibrium
values of health insurance premium p, wages w and interest rate r iterating on the prices
on individual problem and aggregated economy. I then measure the distance of the model
generated moments to their empirical counterpart and adjust the parameters. I do this in two
separate blocks: one for health, which is governed by the parameters λ and q in the model,
and the other for productivity, which involves the iteration on the parameters governing
the evolution of the persistent shock: ρ and ση. I then iterate until the data moments are
matched by the corresponding ones generated by the model.
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Appendix B
Gender Gap in Earnings Dynamics
B.1 Tables of Means
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Men
Mean Mean Var Mean Mean Var Var Mean
age educ log earnings wage hours log wage log hs earnings
1979 1,489 34.1 13.1 0.325 18.4 2275 0.278 0.071 20,618
1980 1,565 34.6 13.2 0.329 17.8 2240 0.285 0.076 22,322
1981 1,639 35.1 13.2 0.390 17.7 2197 0.302 0.084 24,272
1982 1,713 35.4 13.4 0.437 17.7 2178 0.340 0.094 25,556
1983 1,792 36.0 13.4 0.427 17.9 2198 0.338 0.085 27,013
1984 1,878 36.5 13.6 0.417 18.4 2250 0.350 0.076 29,537
1985 1,937 37.1 13.6 0.436 18.6 2251 0.365 0.076 31,042
1986 2,014 37.8 13.6 0.433 18.8 2262 0.366 0.082 31,849
1987 2,063 38.4 13.6 0.408 19.1 2280 0.354 0.068 33,980
1988 2,062 39.3 13.6 0.410 19.5 2287 0.362 0.080 36,003
1989 2,022 40.1 13.6 0.426 19.4 2300 0.370 0.077 37,943
1990 1,948 40.7 13.6 0.446 19.4 2298 0.383 0.078 40,084
1991 1,897 41.3 13.7 0.448 20.0 2264 0.396 0.081 42,096
1992 1,735 41.8 13.7 0.465 21.0 2242 0.384 0.087 45,496
1993 1,694 42.2 13.7 0.475 21.5 2249 0.411 0.083 47,924
1994 1,635 42.9 13.7 0.492 21.5 2286 0.420 0.073 49,962
1995 1,592 43.7 13.8 0.517 21.6 2282 0.440 0.078 51,622
1996 1,515 44.3 13.8 0.463 22.6 2286 0.431 0.075 55,017
year N(y)
Source: PSID, short sample constructed according to section 3.2.1
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Married Women
Mean Mean Var Mean Mean Var Var Mean
age educ log earnings wage hours log wage log hs earnings
1,979 591 33.6 12.9 0.436 11.1 1,645 0.275 0.134 9,144
1,980 640 34.3 13.0 0.423 11.1 1,630 0.285 0.139 10,102
1,981 682 34.7 13.0 0.429 10.7 1,654 0.264 0.132 11,115
1,982 730 35.0 13.1 0.440 10.8 1,668 0.283 0.135 11,998
1,983 794 35.7 13.1 0.451 11.1 1,665 0.271 0.142 12,778
1,984 874 36.1 13.3 0.451 11.2 1,708 0.276 0.133 13,848
1,985 928 36.6 13.3 0.468 11.6 1,715 0.297 0.128 14,865
1,986 970 37.3 13.3 0.455 12.1 1,740 0.302 0.117 15,966
1,987 995 38.2 13.3 0.427 12.7 1,768 0.300 0.116 17,491
1,988 1,009 39.0 13.4 0.431 12.5 1,781 0.299 0.115 18,295
1,989 989 39.8 13.4 0.464 13.0 1,756 0.312 0.122 19,579
1,990 979 40.5 13.4 0.466 12.9 1,772 0.332 0.124 20,521
1,991 955 41.2 13.4 0.454 13.0 1,777 0.318 0.117 21,855
1,992 911 42.0 13.4 0.448 14.0 1,785 0.340 0.119 24,042
1,993 891 42.8 13.4 0.392 15.1 1,813 0.349 0.118 25,979
1,994 849 43.3 13.5 0.434 14.5 1,798 0.321 0.115 26,468
1,995 818 44.0 13.5 0.434 14.9 1,822 0.343 0.108 28,153
1,996 767 44.6 13.6 0.444 15.1 1,827 0.336 0.123 29,485
year N(y)
Source: PSID, short sample constructed according to section 3.2.1
B.2 Alternative Definition of Experience
I considered the construction of variances from the actual experience in the labor market,
as opposed to the potential experience used in the rest of the estimations. This measure of
actual experience is constructed as follows:
expit = age
i
t − 6−max{educationit, 12} − outit
where education is measured in years of formal schooling acquired, and outi is a variable
that indicates how many periods since the individual entered the sample, she has not met
the selection criteria positive hours worked and positive wages.
The results of the estimation under this specification are very similar to those using
potential labor market experience. Figure B.1 shows the empirical earnings profile com-
puted under both specifications. It can be seen there that the profiles do not seem to differ
considerably.
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Figure B.1: Variance profile of log residual earnings for different specifications of labor market
experience, short sample.
